Making mistakes are the best times for brain growth

Most of us have grown up with the idea that mistakes are bad, especially if we attended test-driven schools, where we were frequently marked down for making mistakes, or our parents punished mistakes with harsh words and actions. This is unfortunate, and this is why. 

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... [In a workshop, Carol Dweck] announced that every time we make mistakes, synapses fire in the brain, indicating brain growth. All the teachers in the room were shocked, as they had all been working under the premise that mistakes are to be avoided. Carol was drawing from work that has researched the brain’s response when we make mistakes, particularly investigating the different ways brains respond when people have a growth or a fixed mindset.

Jason Moser and his colleagues extended Carol’s work investigating the brain’s response when we make mistakes. Moser and his team found something stunning. They had asked participants to take tests while they monitored the participants’ brains with MRI technology. They looked at the scans when people got questions correct and when they got them incorrect. The researchers found that when people made mistakes, brains were more active, producing strengthening and growth, than when people got work correct. Neuroscientists now agree that mistakes positively contribute to the strengthening of neural pathways.

This learning key is particularly significant because most teachers design classes so that everyone is successful. Curricula and textbooks are designed with trivial, unchallenging questions, so that students will get a high percentage of answers correct. The common belief is that getting most answers correct will motivate students toward greater 

success. Here’s the problem, though. Getting questions right is not a good brain exercise.

For students to experience growth, they need to be working on questions that challenge them, questions that are at the edge of their understanding. And they need to be working on them in an environment that encourages mistakes and makes students aware of the benefits of mistakes. This point is critical. Not only should the work be challenging to foster mistakes; the environment must also be encouraging, so that the students do not experience challenge or struggle as a deterrent. Both components need to work together. 

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One of the significant characteristics of the highly effective learning described is the presence of mistakes and the role of struggle and error in transforming people from beginners into experts. This is consistent with the brain research showing increased brain activity when people struggle and make mistakes and decreased activity when they get work correct. Unfortunately, most learners think they should always be getting work correct, and many feel that if they make mistakes or struggle, they are not good learners—when this is the very best thing they can be doing.

Practice is important for the development of any knowledge or skill. Anders Ericsson helped the world understand the nature of expert performance and found that most world-class experts—pianists, chess players, novelists, athletes—practiced for around ten thousand hours over twenty years. He also found that their success was not related to tests of intelligence but to the amount of “deliberate practice” they undertook. Importantly, although people succeed because they are trying hard, the people who become experts are trying hard in the right way. A range of different researchers describe effective practice in the same way—people pushing at the edge of their understanding, making mistakes, correcting them, and making more.

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Japan has always scored well in mathematics—it has always finished in one of the top-five TIMSS positions—and was one of the countries visited in the study. The researchers found that Japanese students spent 44 percent of their time “inventing, thinking, and struggling with underlying concepts,” whereas students in the US engaged in this kind of behavior less than 1 percent of the time.

Jim Stigler, one of the authors of the study, writes that the Japanese teachers want the students to struggle—and recalls the times when they would purposely give the wrong answer so that students would go back and work with foundational concepts. In my thousands of observations of classrooms over many years in the US and the UK, I have never seen this kind of practice; more typically I have seen teachers who seem to want to save students from struggle. Many times I have observed students asking for help and teachers structuring the work for students, breaking down questions and converting them into small easy steps. In doing so they empty the work of challenge and opportunities for struggle. Students complete the work and feel good, but often learn little.

I saw a very similar teaching approach, focused on struggle, in a visit to classrooms in China, another country that scores highly in mathematics. I had been asked to visit China to give a talk at a conference and managed, as I like to do, to sneak away and visit some classrooms. In a number of high-school math classrooms, lessons were approximately one hour long, but at no time did I see students working on more than three questions in one hour. This contrasts strongly with a typical US high-school math classroom, where students chug through about thirty questions in an hour—about ten times more. The questions worked on in Chinese classrooms were deeper and more involved than the ones in US classrooms. Teachers would ask provocative questions, deliberately making incorrect statements that students would be challenged to argue against.

One of the lessons I watched was on a topic that is often uninspiring in US classrooms—complementary and supplementary angles. The teacher in China asked the students to define a complementary angle, and the students gave their own ideas for a definition. Often the teacher would push the students’ definition to a place that made it incorrect and playfully ask, “Is this right, then?” The students would groan and try to make the definition more correct. The teacher bantered with the students, playfully extending and sometimes twisting their ideas to push the students to deeper thinking. The students probed, extended, clarified, and justified for a long time, reaching depths that were impressive.

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"I am going to figure this out if it kills me."

When I talk with teachers, they often say this sort of persistence is missing in the students they teach. One of the most common complaints I hear from teachers is that students don’t want to struggle; they want to be told what to do. To the teachers it seems as though students just can’t be bothered with struggling, which is probably what it looks like. The truth is, however, that when students don’t want to struggle, it is because they have a fixed mindset; at some point in their lives they have been given the idea that they cannot be successful and that struggle is an indication that they are not doing well.

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As an academic, I experience a lot of failure. To keep our youcubed center at Stanford running, supporting staff salaries and providing free materials for teachers and parents, we have to apply for lots of grants—most of which are rejected. I also have to submit our papers to journals, where rejection is part of the process. If they are not rejected, they are subject to reviewers’ comments. I have had reviewers dismiss my work entirely, saying that it is “not research, just a story.” It is nearly impossible to keep going as an academic without viewing “failure” as an opportunity to improve. A wise professor named Paul Black, my PhD advisor, once said to me: “Whenever you send a paper to a journal, have in mind the next journal you will send it to when the paper is rejected.” I have used his advice a number of times.

Taking a limitless approach—particularly when embracing challenge and struggle—also helps when we encounter difficult people. In today’s world of social media, it seems impossible to make a statement about anything without getting pushback, some of it aggressive. I have experienced extreme and aggressive pushback many times, and I now know that it is important to stay strong in those moments and to look for something positive. Instead of dismissing a challenge or beating yourself up, think, “I will take something from this situation and use it to improve.”

China

China will not cede this territory (Xinjiang) and, as in Tibet, the window for independence is closing. Both are buffer zones, one is a major land trade route, and – crucially – both offer markets (albeit with a limited income) for an economy which must keep producing and selling goods if it is to continue to grow and to prevent mass unemployment. Failure to so do would likely lead to widespread civil disorder, threatening the control of the Communist Party and the unity of China.

There are similar reasons for the Party’s resistance to democracy and individual rights. If the population were to be given a free vote, the unity of the Han might begin to crack or, more likely, the countryside and urban areas would come into conflict. That in turn would embolden the people of the buffer zones, further weakening China. It is only a century since the most recent humiliation of the rape of China by foreign powers; for Beijing, unity and economic progress are priorities well ahead of democratic principles.

The Chinese look at society very differently from the West. Western thought is infused with the rights of the individual; Chinese thought prizes the collective above the individual. What the West thinks of as the rights of man, the Chinese leadership thinks of as dangerous theories endangering the majority, and much of the population accepts that, at the least, the extended family comes before the individual.

I once took a Chinese ambassador in London to a high-end French restaurant in the hope they would repeat Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s much-quoted answer to Richard Nixon’s question ‘What is the impact of the French Revolution?’, to which the prime minister replied ‘It’s too soon to tell.’ Sadly this was not forthcoming, but I was treated to a stern lecture about how the full imposition of ‘what you call human rights’ in China would lead to widespread violence and death and was then asked, ‘Why do you think your values would work in a culture you don’t understand?’

The deal between the Party leaders and the people has been, for a generation now, ‘We’ll make you better off – you will follow our orders.’ So long as the economy keeps growing, that grand bargain may last. If it stops, or goes into reverse, the deal is off. The current level of demonstrations and anger against corruption and inefficiency are testament to what would happen if the deal breaks.

Another growing problem for the Party is its ability to feed the population. More than 40 per cent of arable land is now either polluted or has thinning topsoil, according to their Ministry of Agriculture.

China is caught in a catch-22. It needs to keep industrialising as it modernises and raises standards of living, but that very process threatens food production. If it cannot solve this problem there will be unrest.

There are now around 500 mostly peaceful protests a day across China over a variety of issues. If you introduce mass unemployment, or mass hunger, that tally will explode in both number and the degree of force used by both sides.

So, on the economic side China now also has a grand bargain with the world – ‘We’ll make the stuff for cheap – you buy it for cheap.’

How did Europe Conquered the World and Why China, Persians and Ottomans Could Not?

The fact that people from a large island in the northern Atlantic conquered a large island south of Australia is one of history’s more bizarre occurrences. Not long before Cook’s expedition, the British Isles and western Europe in general were but distant backwaters of the Mediterranean world. Little of importance ever happened there. Even the Roman Empire – the only important premodern European empire – derived most of its wealth from its North African, Balkan and Middle Eastern provinces. Rome’s western European provinces were a poor Wild West, which contributed little aside from minerals and slaves. Northern Europe was so desolate and barbarous that it wasn’t even worth conquering.

Only at the end of the fifteenth century did Europe become a hothouse of important military, political, economic and cultural developments. Between 1500 and 1750, western Europe gained momentum and became master of the ‘Outer World’, meaning the two American continents and the oceans. Yet even then Europe was no match for the great powers of Asia. Europeans managed to conquer America and gain supremacy at sea mainly because the Asiatic powers showed little interest in them. The early modern era was a golden age for the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean, the Safavid Empire in Persia, the Mughal Empire in India, and the Chinese Ming and Qing dynasties. They expanded their territories significantly and enjoyed unprecedented demographic and economic growth. In 1775 Asia accounted for 80 per cent of the world economy. The combined economies of India and China alone represented two-thirds of global production. In comparison, Europe was an economic dwarf.

The global centre of power shifted to Europe only between 1750 and 1850, when Europeans humiliated the Asian powers in a series of wars and conquered large parts of Asia. By 1900 Europeans firmly controlled the worlds economy and most of its territory. In 1950 western Europe and the United States together accounted for more than half of global production, whereas Chinas portion had been reduced to 5 per cent. Under the European aegis a new global order and global culture emerged. Today all humans are, to a much greater extent than they usually want to admit, European in dress, thought and taste. They may be fiercely anti-European in their rhetoric, but almost everyone on the planet views politics, medicine, war and economics through European eyes, and listens to music written in European modes with words in European languages. Even today’s burgeoning Chinese economy, which may soon regain its global primacy, is built on a European model of production and finance.

How did the people of this frigid finger of Eurasia manage to break out of their remote corner of the globe and conquer the entire world? Europe’s scientists are often given much of the credit. It’s unquestionable that from 1850 onward European domination rested to a large extent on the military–industrial–scientific complex and technological wizardry. All successful late modern empires cultivated scientific research in the hope of harvesting technological innovations, and many scientists spent most of their time working on arms, medicines and machines for their imperial masters. A common saying among European soldiers facing African enemies was, ‘Come what may, we have machine guns, and they don’t.’ Civilian technologies were no less important. Canned food fed soldiers, railroads and steamships transported soldiers and their provisions, while a new arsenal of medicines cured soldiers, sailors and locomotive engineers. These logistical advances played a more significant role in the European conquest of Africa than did the machine gun.

But that wasn’t the case before 1850. The military-industrial-scientific complex was still in its infancy; the technological fruits of the Scientific Revolution were unripe; and the technological gap between European, Asiatic and African powers was small. In 1770, James Cook certainly had far better technology than the Australian Aborigines, but so did the Chinese and the Ottomans. Why then was Australia explored and colonised by Captain James Cook and not by Captain Wan Zhengse or Captain Hussein Pasha? More importantly, if in 1770 Europeans had no significant technological advantage over Muslims, Indians and Chinese, how did they manage in the following century to open such a gap between themselves and the rest of the world?

Why did the military-industrial-scientific complex blossom in Europe rather than India? When Britain leaped forward, why were France, Germany and the United States quick to follow, whereas China lagged behind? When the gap between industrial and non-industrial nations became an obvious economic and political factor, why did Russia, Italy and Austria succeed in closing it, whereas Persia, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire failed? After all, the technology of the first industrial wave was relatively simple. Was it so hard for Chinese or Ottomans to engineer steam engines, manufacture machine guns and lay down railroads?

The world’s first commercial railroad opened for business in 1830, in Britain. By 1850, Western nations were criss-crossed by almost 40,000 kilometres of railroads – but in the whole of Asia, Africa and Latin America there were only 4,000 kilometres of tracks. In 1880, the West boasted more than 350,000 kilometres of railroads, whereas in the rest of the world there were but 35,000 kilometres of train lines (and most of these were laid by the British in India). The first railroad in China opened only in 1876. It was twenty-five kilometres long and built by Europeans – the Chinese government destroyed it the following year. In 1880 the Chinese Empire did not operate a single railroad. The first railroad in Persia was built only in 1888, and it connected Tehran with a Muslim holy site about ten kilometres south of the capital. It was constructed and operated by a Belgian company. In 1950, the total railway network of Persia still amounted to a meagre 2,500 kilometres, in a country seven times the size of Britain.

The Chinese and Persians did not lack technological inventions such as steam engines (which could be freely copied or bought). They lacked the values, myths, judicial apparatus and sociopolitical structures that took centuries to form and mature in the West and which could not be copied and internalised rapidly. France and the United States quickly followed in Britain’s footsteps because the French and Americans  “already shared the most important British myths and social structures. The Chinese and Persians could not catch up as quickly because they thought and organised their societies differently.

This explanation sheds new light on the period from 1500 to 1850. During this era Europe did not enjoy any obvious technological, political, military or economic advantage over the Asian powers, yet the continent built up a unique potential, whose importance suddenly became obvious around 1850. The apparent equality between Europe, China and the Muslim world in 1750 was a mirage. Imagine two builders, each busy constructing very tall towers. One builder uses wood and mud bricks, whereas the other uses steel and concrete. At first it seems that there is not much of a difference between the two methods, since both towers grow at a similar pace and reach a similar height. However, once a critical threshold is crossed, the wood and mud tower cannot stand the strain and collapses, whereas the steel and concrete tower grows storey by storey, as far as the eye can see.

What potential did Europe develop in the early modern period that enabled it to dominate the late modern world? There are two complementary answers to this question: modern science and capitalism. Europeans were used to thinking and behaving in a scientific and capitalist way even before they enjoyed any significant technological advantages. When the technological bonanza began, Europeans could harness it far better than anybody else. So it is hardly coincidental that science and capitalism form the most important legacy that European imperialism has bequeathed the post-European world of the twenty-first century. Europe and Europeans no longer rule the world, but science and capital are growing ever stronger. 


Modern science flourished in and thanks to European empires. The discipline obviously owes a huge debt to ancient scientific traditions, such as those of classical Greece, China, India and Islam, yet its unique character began to take shape only in the early modern period, hand in hand with the imperial expansion of Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, Russia and the Netherlands. During the early modern period, Chinese, Indians, Muslims, Native Americans and Polynesians continued to make important contributions to the Scientific Revolution. The insights of Muslim economists were studied by Adam Smith and Karl Marx, treatments pioneered by Native American doctors found their way into English medical texts and data extracted from Polynesian informants revolutionised Western anthropology. But until the mid-twentieth century, the people who collated these myriad scientific discoveries, creating scientific disciplines in the process, were the ruling and intellectual elites of the global European empires. The Far East and the Islamic world produced minds as intelligent and curious as those of Europe. However, between 1500 and 1950 they did not produce anything that comes even close to Newtonian physics or Darwinian biology.

This does not mean that Europeans have a unique gene for science, or that they will forever dominate the study of physics and biology. Just as Islam began as an Arab monopoly but was subsequently taken over by Turks and Persians, so modern science began as a European speciality, but is today becoming a multi-ethnic enterprise.

What forged the historical bond between modern science and European imperialism? Technology was an important factor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but in the early modern era it was of limited importance. The key factor was that the plant-seeking botanist and the colony-seeking naval officer shared a similar mindset. Both scientist and conqueror began by admitting ignorance – they both said, ‘I don’t know what’s out there.’ They both felt compelled to go out and make new discoveries. And they both hoped the new knowledge thus acquired would make them masters of the world.

European imperialism was entirely unlike all other imperial projects in history. Previous seekers of empire tended to assume that they already understood the world. Conquest merely utilised and spread their view of the world. The Arabs, to name one example, did not conquer Egypt, Spain or India in order to discover something they did not know. The Romans, Mongols and Aztecs voraciously conquered new lands in search of power and wealth – not of knowledge. In contrast, European imperialists set out to distant shores in the hope of obtaining new knowledge along with new territories.

Tea vs Cha

Nikhil Sonnad, Quartz

With a few minor exceptions, there are really only two ways to say “tea” in the world. One is like the English term—té in Spanish and tee in Afrikaans are two examples. The other is some variation of cha, like chay in Hindi.

Both versions come from China. How they spread around the world offers a clear picture of how globalization worked before “globalization” was a term anybody used. The words that sound like “cha” spread across land, along the Silk Road. The “tea”-like phrasings spread over water, by Dutch traders bringing the novel leaves back to Europe.

The term cha (茶) is “Sinitic,” meaning it is common to many varieties of Chinese. It began in China and made its way through central Asia, eventually becoming “chay” (چای) in Persian. That is no doubt due to the trade routes of the Silk Road, along which, according to a recent discovery, tea was traded over 2,000 years ago. This form spread beyond Persia, becoming chay in Urdu, shay in Arabic, and chay in Russian, among others. It even it made its way to sub-Saharan Africa, where it became chai in Swahili. The Japanese and Korean terms for tea are also based on the Chinese cha, though those languages likely adopted the word even before its westward spread into Persian.

But that doesn’t account for “tea.” The Chinese character for tea, 茶, is pronounced differently by different varieties of Chinese, though it is written the same in them all. In today’s Mandarin, it is chá. But in the Min Nan variety of Chinese, spoken in the coastal province of Fujian, the character is pronounced te. The key word here is “coastal.”

The te form used in coastal-Chinese languages spread to Europe via the Dutch, who became the primary traders of tea between Europe and Asia in the 17th century, as explained in the World Atlas of Language Structures. The main Dutch ports in east Asia were in Fujian and Taiwan, both places where people used the te pronunciation. The Dutch East India Company’s expansive tea importation into Europe gave us the French thé, the German Tee, and the English tea.

Yet the Dutch were not the first to Asia. That honor belongs to the Portuguese, who are responsible for the island of Taiwan’s colonial European name, Formosa. And the Portuguese traded not through Fujian but Macao, where chá is used. That’s why, on the map above, Portugal is a pink dot in a sea of blue.

A few languages have their own way of talking about tea. These languages are generally in places where tea grows naturally, which led locals to develop their own way to refer to it. In Burmese, for example, tea leaves are lakphak.

The map demonstrates two different eras of globalization in action: the millenia-old overland spread of goods and ideas westward from ancient China, and the 400-year-old influence of Asian culture on the seafaring Europeans of the age of exploration. Also, you just learned a new word in nearly every language on the planet.

The history of tea (Çayın tarihi)

Çayın Osmanlı’ya gelişi 19. yy sonlarını buluyor. Tarih yazarı Murat Bardakçı’ya göre bu tanışma, İstanbul’daki bazı dükkânların az miktarda çay ithal etmeye başlamasıyla olmuş. Çaya olan düşkünlüğü ile bilinen Hacı Mehmed İzzet Efendi’nin “Çay Risalesi” kitabı ise 1879’da İstanbul’da basılmış.

Osmanlı’da çay yetiştirmeye yönelik bilinen ilk ciddi girişim Sultan II. Abdülhamid dönemine rastlıyor. 1892’de yayınlanan “Coğrafyayı Sınai ve Ticari” adlı kitapta, dönemin Ticaret Nazırı Esbak–ı İsmail Paşa’nın aracılığı ile Çin’den getirilen çay fidanları ve tohumlarının Bursa’da ekildiği anlatılıyor ancak ekolojik koşulların uygun olmaması nedeniyle sonuç alınamadığı belirtiliyor.

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri’nde daha sonra bulunan ve Osmanlı’da çay tarımına ilişkin ilk arşiv belgesi olarak kabul edilen belgede ise, tohumların Japonya’dan getirtildiği yazıyor. 

Tarih kitaplarında Türklerin, Anadolu’ya gelmeden önce Orta Asya’da çayla tanıştıkları yazıyor. Kazan Tatar Türklerinden dil islahatçısı, Abdül’l-Kayyûm Nâsırî, “Fevakihü’l–Cülesâ” adlı eserinde, 12. yy’da Kazakistan’da yaşayan Türk şair Hoca Ahmet Yesevi’nin çayı içen ilk Türk olduğunu anlatıyor. Nâsırî, Hoca Ahmet Yesevi’nin misafir olduğu Türkmen komşunun evinde içtiği sıcak çayın yorgunluğunu giderdiğini ve “Hastalarınıza bundan içirin ki şifa bulsunlar” diye dua ettiğini yazıyor. 

Çay içme tarzları ise yörelere göre değişiyor. Örneğin, Erzurum ve doğusundaki illerde çay, açık renkli ve kaşıksız gelir ve “kıtlama” denen özel bir yöntemle içilir. Kıtlama, Kars ve Erzurum yöresinde üretilen büyük ve sert şekerlere verilen isim. Özel makaslarla, elle ya da ısırılarak koparılan ufak parçalar, dil altına konur ve çay içildikçe, eriyen şeker de tat verir. Eğer misafirseniz, siz “yeter” demedikçe çay sürekli tazelenir. Teşekkür edip, başka istemediğinizi söyleseniz bile mutlaka bir bardak daha ikram edilir. Bunun adı cırıldım yani zor çayıdır. Cırıldım çayını içmemek ise ev sahibine karşı büyük bir hakaret anlamına gelir.

Güneydoğu’da genelde kaçak çayı içilir. Rengi koyu, tadı daha acıdır. Bardaklar da diğer bölgelere göre biraz daha büyük olur. Gümüşhaneliler orta, Trabzonlular ise az şekerli çayı tercih eder. Tokat’ta bardak ufak olsa da mutlaka dudak payı bırakılır. Rizelilere göre ise en güzeli Çaykur’un üretimi yani kendi çaylarıdır.

Hangi biçimde içerse içsin Türklerin ortak tutkusu ise cam bardaktır. Rengini görmek, sıcaklığını hissetmek ve kaşığın cama vurduğunda çıkardığı sesi duymak ister çay içen.

Deniz Gürsoy kitabında, Türkiye’de kullanılan bardakları “İnce belli, Ajda ve lale biçimli” olmak üzere kabaca üçe ayırıyor ve Ajda bardak isminin hikayesini anlatıyor: ”Rivayete göre Paşabahçe bu bardağı imal eder ve Aida serisi olarak reyonlara koyar. Fakat halk Aida’yı görmek istediği gibi yani ‘Ajda’ olarak okur ve bardağın ismi böyle kalır”.
Kaynak NTV

China and Science

Chinese schoolchildren are still taught to think of this general period as the “century of humiliation,” the nadir of China’s long fall from its Ming-dynasty peak. Back when the ancient observatory was built, China could rightly regard itself as the lone survivor of the great Bronze Age civilizations, a class that included the Babylonians, the Mycenaeans, and even the ancient Egyptians. Western poets came to regard the latter’s ruins as Ozymandian proof that nothing lasted. But China had lasted. Its emperors presided over the planet’s largest complex social organization. They commanded tribute payments from China’s neighbors, whose rulers sent envoys to Beijing to perform a baroque face-to-the-ground bowing ceremony for the emperors’ pleasure.

In the first volume of his landmark series, Science and Civilisation in China, published in 1954, the British Sinologist Joseph Needham asked why the scientific revolution hadn’t happened in China, given its sophisticated intellectual meritocracy, based on exams that measured citizens’ mastery of classical texts. This inquiry has since become known as the “Needham Question,” though Voltaire too had wondered why Chinese mathematics stalled out at geometry, and why it was the Jesuits who brought the gospel of Copernicus into China, and not the other way around. He blamed the Confucian emphasis on tradition. Other historians blamed China’s remarkably stable politics. A large landmass ruled by long dynasties may have encouraged less technical dynamism than did Europe, where more than 10 polities were crammed into a small area, triggering constant conflict. As we know from the Manhattan Project, the stakes of war have a way of sharpening the scientific mind.

Still others have accused premodern China of insufficient curiosity about life beyond its borders. (Notably, there seems to have been very little speculation in China about extraterrestrial life before the modern era.) This lack of curiosity is said to explain why China pressed pause on naval innovation during the late Middle Ages, right at the dawn of Europe’s age of exploration, when the Western imperial powers were looking fondly back through the medieval fog to seafaring Athens.

Whatever the reason, China paid a dear price for slipping behind the West in science and technology. In 1793, King George III stocked a ship with the British empire’s most dazzling inventions and sent it to China, only to be rebuffed by its emperor, who said he had “no use” for England’s trinkets. Nearly half a century later, Britain returned to China, seeking buyers for India’s opium harvest. China’s emperor again declined, and instead cracked down on the local sale of the drug, culminating in the seizure and flamboyant seaside destruction of 2 million pounds of British-owned opium. Her Majesty’s Navy responded with the full force of its futuristic technology, running ironclad steamships straight up the Yangtze, sinking Chinese junk boats, until the emperor had no choice but to sign the first of the “unequal treaties” that ceded Hong Kong, along with five other ports, to British jurisdiction. After the French made a colony of Vietnam, they joined in this “slicing of the Chinese melon,” as it came to be called, along with the Germans, who occupied a significant portion of Shandong province.

Meanwhile Japan, a “little brother” as far as China was concerned, responded to Western aggression by quickly modernizing its navy, such that in 1894, it was able to sink most of China’s fleet in a single battle, taking Taiwan as the spoils. And this was just a prelude to Japan’s brutal mid-20th-century invasion of China, part of a larger campaign of civilizational expansion that aimed to spread Japanese power to the entire Pacific, a campaign that was largely successful, until it encountered the United States and its city-leveling nukes.

China’s humiliations multiplied with America’s rise. After sending 200,000 laborers to the Western Front in support of the Allied war effort during World War I, Chinese diplomats arrived at Versailles expecting something of a restoration, or at least relief from the unequal treaties. Instead, China was seated at the kids’ table with Greece and Siam, while the Western powers carved up the globe.

Only recently has China regained its geopolitical might, after opening to the world during Deng Xiaoping’s 1980s reign. Deng evinced a near-religious reverence for science and technology, a sentiment that is undimmed in Chinese culture today. The country is on pace to outspend the United States on R&D this decade, but the quality of its research varies a great deal. According to one study, even at China’s most prestigious academic institutions, a third of scientific papers are faked or plagiarized. Knowing how poorly the country’s journals are regarded, Chinese universities are reportedly offering bonuses of up to six figures to researchers who publish in Western journals.

It remains an open question whether Chinese science will ever catch up with that of the West without a bedrock political commitment to the free exchange of ideas. China’s persecution of dissident scientists began under Mao, whose ideologues branded Einstein’s theories “counterrevolutionary.” But it did not end with him. Even in the absence of overt persecution, the country’s “great firewall” handicaps Chinese scientists, who have difficulty accessing data published abroad.

China has learned the hard way that spectacular scientific achievements confer prestige upon nations. The “Celestial Kingdom” looked on from the sidelines as Russia flung the first satellite and human being into space, and then again when American astronauts spiked the Stars and Stripes into the lunar crust.

China has largely focused on the applied sciences. It built the world’s fastest supercomputer, spent heavily on medical research, and planted a “great green wall” of forests in its northwest as a last-ditch effort to halt the Gobi Desert’s spread. Now China is bringing its immense resources to bear on the fundamental sciences. The country plans to build an atom smasher that will conjure thousands of “god particles” out of the ether, in the same time it took cern’s Large Hadron Collider to strain out a handful. It is also eyeing Mars. In the technopoetic idiom of the 21st century, nothing would symbolize China’s rise like a high-definition shot of a Chinese astronaut setting foot on the red planet.

Ross Andersen, The Atlantic
 

Dünya Avrupa'dan İbaret (Mi?)

Kopernik modern astronomiyi kuran kitabını ölüm döşeğindeyken yayınladı.
Ondan üç asır önce, Arap bilim adamları Müeyyeddin el-Urdi ve Nasreddin el-Tusi bu eserin oluşumunda büyük önem taşıyan teoremleri ortaya koymuşlardı. Kopernik onları kullandı, ama hiçbir kaynak göstermedi.

Avrupa aynaya baktığında dünyayı gördüğünü sanıyordu.
Onun ötesi, bir hiçlik.

Rönesans’ı mümkün kılan üç icat, pusula, barut ve matbaa Çin’den geliyordu. Babilliler, gerçeği Pisagor’a bin beş yüz yıl önce söylemişlerdi. Hindular herkesten çok önce dünyanın yuvarlak olduğunu öğrenmişler ve yaşını hesaplamışlardı. Ve Mayalar yıldızları, yani gecenin gözlerini ve zamanın gizemlerini herkesten çok daha iyi tanımışlardı.

Ancak bu küçük ayrıntılar dikkat çekmeye layık değillerdi. 

Making the grade: Chinese school lets failing students borrow points from ‘mark bank’

Exams can be a major source of anxiety for students, especially if they receive a failing mark. But one school in China is now allowing its pupils to borrow necessary points from a ‘grade bank’ in order to pass any test.

The innovative scheme is the brainchild of the Nanjing No 1 High School in Nanjing, Jiangsu province, which is running a trial of the concept with its 10th grade Advanced Placement (AP) class, the South China Morning Post reported, citing the Yangtze Evening Post. 

The director of the school,Kan Huang, said the new scheme is an effort to place more emphasis on students' growth rather than their exam performance, noting the current exam-oriented culture which could lead to a pupil's future being determined by a "single major exam."

Physics teacher Mei Hong also hailed the scheme, saying it is aimed at giving students a second chance.

“Fifty-nine points and 60 points are actually not that different,” she said, noting that one score is failing while the other is passing. The difference, however, "weighs heavily on students' psyches."

A total of 13 students out of 49 have so far borrowed points from the grade bank.

One of those students took points to pass a recent geography exam after falling ill.

"Because I was sick, I missed some classes. The mark bank saved my grade," he said.

But just as borrowing money from a real bank comes with the requirement of paying it back with interest, the grade bank works the same way.

Students must repay the marks by scoring extra points on a future exam, though some teachers also allow students to pay them back by conducting public speeches or lab experiments.

And just like a regular bank, students are allowed to pay in installments – and those who do not pay back their debts will be prevented from future borrowing.

Parents who are involved in the banking industry were asked by the school to help devise the scheme.

China's education system is extremely dependent on just a few major exams, with college entry almost entirely determined by one test in the final year of school. Students are therefore under increased pressure to perform, with a 2014 study finding that most cases of student suicides can be attributed to pressure from school tests.

https://www.rt.com/news/373571-chinese-students-grade-bank/

Today the main source of wealth is knowledge

Today the main source of wealth is knowledge. And whereas you can conquer oil fields through war, you cannot acquire knowledge that way. Hence as knowledge became the most important economic resource, the profitability of war declined and wars became increasingly restricted to those parts of the world – such as the Middle East and Central Africa – where the economies are still old-fashioned material-based economies.

In 1998 it made sense for Rwanda to seize and loot the rich coltan mines of neighbouring Congo, because this ore was in high demand for the manufacture of mobile phones and laptops, and Congo held 80 per cent of the world’s coltan reserves. Rwanda earned $240 million annually from the looted coltan. For poor Rwanda that was a lot of money.  In contrast, it would have made no sense for China to invade California and seize Silicon Valley, for even if the Chinese could somehow prevail on the battlefield, there were no silicon mines to loot in Silicon Valley. Instead, the Chinese have earned billions of dollars from cooperating with hi-tech giants such as Apple and Microsoft, buying their software and manufacturing their products. What Rwanda earned from an entire year of looting Congolese coltan, the Chinese earn in a single day of peaceful commerce.

In consequence, the word ‘peace’ has acquired a new meaning. Previous generations thought about peace as the temporary absence of war. Today we think about peace as the implausibility of war. When in 1913 people said that there was peace between France and Germany, they meant that ‘there is no war going on at present between France and Germany, but who knows what next year will bring’. When today we say that there is peace between France and Germany, we mean that  it is inconceivable under any foreseeable circumstances that war might break out between them. Such peace prevails not only between France and Germany, but between most (though not all) countries. There is no scenario for a serious war breaking out next year between Germany and Poland, between Indonesia and the Philippines, or between Brazil and Uruguay. 

  

Why the Industrial Revolution didn’t happen in China

To economic historians like Joel Mokyr, there's nothing inevitable about the incredible wealth and health of the modern world. But for a spark in a little corner of Europe that ignited the Industrial Revolution — which spread incredible advances in technology and living standards first across the north Atlantic coast in the 1700 and 1800s and gradually around the world — we could all be living the nasty, brutish and short lives of our ancestors centuries before.

Mokyr, who teaches at Northwestern University, dives into the mystery of how the world went from being poor to being so rich in just a few centuries in a forthcoming book, “A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy.”

Drawing on centuries of philosophy and scientific advancements, Mokyr argues that there's a reason the Industrial Revolution occurred in Europe and not, for example, in China, which had in previous centuries shown signs of more scientific advancement: Europe developed a unique culture of competitive scientific and intellectual advancement that was unprecedented and not at all predestined.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

Why is it important to consider this question, of why the Industrial Revolution occurred?

It is a question that needs to be asked if we want to know how we became what we are. The 19th and 20th centuries are in many ways the most transformative centuries in all of human history. Until about 1800, the vast bulk of people on this planet were poor. And when I say poor, I mean they were on the brink of physical starvation for most of their lives.

Life expectancy in 1750 was around 38 at most, and much lower in some places. The notion that today we would live 80 years, and spend much of those in leisure, is totally unexpected. The lower middle class in Western and Asian industrialized societies today has a higher living standard than the pope and the emperors of a few centuries back, in every dimension. That is the result of one thing: Our ability to understand the forces of nature and harness them for our economic needs.

If we understood how that happened, we would understand human history. For thousands of years, the material conditions that people lived in changed very little. Then all of a sudden, in 1800, it just zooms up.

That came out of Western Europe and its offshoot in North America after 1800. If it hadn’t been for that, you and I would be looking at a life expectancy of maybe 40, and I probably I wouldn’t be sipping cappuccino from a fancy machine and talking to you on my smartphone. Look at what we have achieved in every dimension. Technology hasn’t just increased our income, it’s changed every aspect of daily life.

The question is, was all this inevitable? My answer is, absolutely no.

So why did this dramatic change occur? And why did it start in Europe, rather than in China?

China has a glorious past in its scientific achievements. And yet they were never able to turn it into economic growth as the West did. If you look at Europe and China in the 19th century, Europe is advancing at breathtaking speed. It’s building a rail network, steamships, factories. By the early 20th century, China looked like it was going to be completely occupied by imperialist powers. Clearly the technological and economic development of East and West diverged from 1850 on. The $64,000 question is “Why?”

People have given different answers, and I’m giving mine. One way of thinking about it is culture. But to state, “Hey, the Chinese have a different culture because they were Confucianists, and the Europeans were Christian,” I don’t buy that for a second. It’s much more subtle and complicated. The way I would phrase it is that culture is not independent of political and institutional circumstances.

China and Europe are different in many ways, but one is that after the Mongol conquest in the 12th century, China remains a unified empire run by a single Mandarin bureaucracy. There is nothing that competes with or threatens China. China does get invaded by Manchu tribes in 1644, but they don’t change the structure of the state. They learned to speak Chinese, dress like Chinese and eat like Chinese.

In Europe, no one ever succeeds in unifying it, and you have continuous competition. The French are worried about the English, the English are worried about the Spanish, the Spanish are worried about the Turks. That keeps everybody on their toes, which is something economists immediately recognize as the competitive model. To have progress, you want a system that is competitive, not one that is dominated by a single power.

I think that is the major difference. It isn’t just that China doesn’t have an Industrial Revolution, it doesn’t have a Galileo or a Newton or a Descartes, people who announced that everything people did before them was wrong. That’s hard to do in any society, but it was easier to do in Europe than China. The reason precisely is because Europe was fragmented, and so when somebody says something very novel and radical, if the government decides they are a heretic and threatens to prosecute them, they pack their suitcase and go across the border.

Europe creates a competitive world that encourages intellectual innovation. There’s the Reformation, which says the religion you had until now is wrong. The same happens in astronomy, chemistry, medicine, mathematics and philosophy. Eventually, it filters down to how we make textiles and shoes, and how we grow corn.

I want to make clear, very few serious historians think China failed. China wanted stability and security, and they achieved that for a long time. The Europeans don’t want stability. They want progress. Of course, China’s stability gets disrupted by Europeans showing up with more powerful ships and guns. Eventually, China crumbles under the onslaught of European modernity. It’s quite a tragic story.

Your book talks about how the Industrial Revolution resulted from a preference for “useful knowledge” and a connection that forms between the social elite and the productive sector of society. Explain that.

Between Columbus’s voyage to America in 1492 and the death of Isaac Newton in 1727, the agenda of research in Europe changes. For much of human history, people studied science and natural phenomena, not to make us materially better off, but just to satisfy curiosity. The ancient Greeks made fantastic scientific progress, but there are few instances in which they use it for anything. In fact, Aristotle says science shouldn’t be used, because work is something for the lower classes. Learned people didn’t work, and working people didn’t learn.

Before the Industrial Revolution, learned people in Europe changed the agenda. They say, “Look, we should study nature, but we should do so to improve our material welfare.” To people today, this sounds totally obvious. But it wasn’t in the year 1600. By the 18th century, this has become the consensus. That's what I call the Industrial Enlightenment.

Many of the scientific issues they were trying to solve, they couldn’t. But they kept trying, and by the 19th century, they start cracking problems. Electricity is one example. For 100 years, people struggle with trying to harness its power. Only by the 1860s is electrical generation cracked, and then all of a sudden you get Thomas Edison, electrical lighting and street cars. The same thing happened in the understanding of infectious disease, which is the main reason life expectancy goes up. These advances took a long time. But they never gave up, and in the end they cracked it. If you think about it, this is quite astonishing.

Now we haven’t cracked everything. I can’t tell you if we are going to crack nuclear fusion. But that’s what this game is all about, that nature is comprehensible, and we can understand and use it. We can never understand 100 percent of it, but we can do better and better.

In China today, people often talk about the country’s rich history of invention, for example of printing, gunpowder and the compass. And you mention that China had its own Enlightenment. So how was that different?  

China was extremely innovative in its heyday, which is basically under the Song dynasty, which ended in 1279. At that time, European and Islamic travelers realized that China was leading the world in technology. And China does have kind of an Enlightenment. And yet, in the end, they did not turn that innovation into sustained economic growth.

I believe the fundamental reason is China’s position as a single empire, and also its bureaucracy, which is a unique and peculiar animal. On the one hand, it is very progressive, because it is a meritocracy. In Europe, the people who were in power were the sons and nephews of other people in power. But in China there’s an examination, and the people who did the best rose in the Mandarin civil service. So you’d think, “Wow, that’s very progressive.” Except if you look at what they were studying for these exams, they were simply regurgitating the classics. It was the perfect tool to keep reproducing from the same mold generation after generation.

In Europe, something different happens. People study classical knowledge, Ptolemy and Hippocrates and Archimedes, and they begin to say, “Most of this stuff is wrong.” You couldn’t do that in China. If you said “This stuff is wrong,” you failed your exam. But in Europe, the ability to challenge received wisdom is irrepressible.

In the 17th century, Europeans build microscopes, telescopes and barometers that allow them to study nature in a way the classics never could. And they become rather cocky. There’s a French philosopher in the late 16th century, Pierre de La Ramée, who writes a book with the title “Everything Aristotle Has Said Is Wrong.” That’s chutzpah. A century earlier, he would have been strung up.

For example, Aristotle famously thought that a vacuum was impossible. Then one day, Europeans build a vacuum pump. The only conclusion they could reach is Aristotle is wrong. If he was wrong about that, could he be wrong about other things? You bet. Aristotle thought all the stars in the heavens were completely fixed; nothing is added and nothing is subtracted. In 1573, a Danish astronomer called Tycho Brahe observes a supernova. There was a star there before, and now it’s not. So people start being skeptical, and skepticism leads to what I call contestability. Arguments are decided not on authority, but on evidence, logic and mathematical proof.

That seems perfectly normal to us, but it's something that had to be learned. It's something no other society pulls off. In other places, wisdom and knowledge were revealed to our forefathers, and if you want to know the truth, you have to study their writings, whether it’s the Bible, or Confucius, or the Koran, or the Talmud.

What implications does all this have for our world today?

There's a debate about the extent to which everything that can be invented has been invented. Have we picked all the low hanging fruit, can we continue to grow the way we did? I take a very optimistic view. I think if you want to summarize the future of technology, the short summary is, “You ain’t seen nothing yet.”

The reason I say this is because science advances in part because people have the tools to work on problems. In the scientific advances of the 17th century, the microscope, the telescope and the barometer play a very important role. Now, if you ask what science has to work with today, it boggles the mind. We have microscopes that see the sub-molecular level. We have telescopes that see galaxies nobody dreamed existed. We have labs full of computers. A computer can find nanoscopic needles in a hay stack the size of Montana. The question is not, “What do computers do for our research?” The question people ask today is, “How the hell did anyone do anything before we had computers?”

We are going to make so much more progress, simply because we have more powerful tools. As science advances, it will push our capability of controlling nature further. Now, the problems also get harder. We are dealing with issues like climate change and desertification. But our capability of solving them is going even faster, which is why I’m optimistic.

Ana Swanson

The Washington Post, 28 Ekim 2016

Yeni Mutlakiyetçilik

Kasım 2009’da Kuzey Kore hükümeti iktisatçıların para reformu olarak adlandırdıkları bir uygulama başlattı. Bu tür reformların nedeni genellikle şiddetli enflasyon dönemleridir. Ocak 1960’da Fransa’da gerçekleştirilen bir para reformu tedavüldeki frangın 100 katına karşılık gelen yeni bir frangı uygulamaya koydu. Eski franklar tedavülde kaldı, hatta yeni frangın değerinde değişiklik oldukça insanlar fiyat vermek için eski frangı kullandı. Sonunda Fransa avro’ya geçince Ocak 2002’de eski franklar tedavülden kaldırıldı. Kuzey Kore reformu görünüşte Fransa’dakiyle benzerlik taşır. 1960 Fransa’sında olduğu gibi Kuzey Kore hükümeti de paradan iki sıfır atmaya karar verdi. 100 eski won, Kuzey Kore’nin para birimi, artık bir yeni wona karşılık geliyordu. Bireyler eski paralarını getirip yeni basılmış paralarla değiştirebileceklerdi; fakat Fransa örneğindeki gibi 42 yılda değil, bir haftada. Sonra meselenin içyüzü anlaşıldı: Hükümet kimsenin 100 binden wondan daha fazlasını değiştiremeyeceğini duyurdu; gerçi sonradan bunu 500 bine wona kadar esnettiler. 100 bin won karaborsada yaklaşık 40 dolara karşılık geliyordu. Böylece hükümet Kuzey Kore yurttaşlarına ait muazzam miktarda şahsi birikimi tek hamlede silip süpürdü; ne kadar olduğunu tam olarak bilemiyoruz, fakat muhtemelen Arjantin hükümetinin 2002’de el koyduğundan daha fazlaydı.

Kuzey Kore hükümeti özel mülkiyete ve piyasalara karşı çıkan komünist bir diktatörlüktür. Fakat karaborsayı kontrol etmek güçtür; ayrıca karaborsada alım satım işlemleri nakit parayla yapılır. İşin içinde “az miktarda yabancı para vardır elbette, özellikle de Çin parası, fakat çoğu işlemde won kullanılır. Para reformu bu pazarları kullanan insanları cezalandırmak ve özellikle bunların aşırı derecede zenginleşip ya da güçlenip rejim için tehdit oluşturmadıklarından emin olmak için tasarlanmıştı. Bunları fakir tutmak daha güvenliydi. Ayrıca Kuzey Kore halkı tasarruflarını wona yatırıyordu çünkü Kore’de az banka vardı ve hepsi de hükümete aitti. Neticede hükümet para reformunu halkın tasarruflarının büyük bölümüne el koymak için kullanmıştı.

Hükümet her ne kadar piyasaların kötü olduğunu söylese de, Kuzey Kore eliti piyasaların kendilerine sağladığı şeylerden memnun. Liderleri Kim Jong-Il’in içinde bir barı, bir karaoke makinesi ve bir mini sinema salonu olan yedi katlı bir sarayı var. Giriş katında dalga makinesi olan devasa büyüklükte bir havuz bulunuyor; Kim bu havuzda küçük bir motoru olan bir body-board kullanmayı seviyor. 2006’da Birleşik Devletler Kuzey Kore’ye bazı yaptırımlar uyguladığında rejimi nasıl can evinden vuracağını biliyordu. 60’tan fazla lüks tüketim maddesinin ihracatını yasakladı; bunlara yatlar, jetskiler, yarış arabaları, motosikletler, DVD oynatıcılar, 29 ekrandan büyük televizyonlar da dahildi. Artık ipek eşarplar, özel tasarım dolmakalemler, kürkler ya da deri çantalar yoktu. Bunlar tam da Kim ve onun Komünist Parti elitlerine hitap eden kalemlerdi. Bir bilim insanı, “Fransız şirketi Hennessy’nin rakamlarını kullanarak Kim’in yaptırımlardan önceki konyak bütçesinin yılda 800 bin doları bulmuş olabileceğini hesapladı.

20. yüzyılın sonunda dünyanın pek çok fakir bölgesini anlayabilmek ancak 20. yüzyılın yeni mutlakıyetçiliğini anlamakla mümkündür; yani komünizmi. Marx’ın öngördüğü, daha insani koşullar altında ve eşitsizlik olmadan zenginlik üretecek bir sistemdi. Lenin ve onun Komünist Partisi Marx’tan esinlendi, fakat pratik, kuramdan bundan daha farklı olamazdı. 1917 Bolşevik Devrimi kanlı bir hadiseydi ve hiçbir insani yönü yoktu. Lenin ve etrafındakilerin yaptığı ilk şey Bolşevik Parti’nin başına yeni bir eliti, yani kendilerini getirmek olduğundan denklemde eşitliğe de yer yoktu. Bunları yaparken yalnızca komünist olmayan unsurları değil, iktidarları için tehdit oluşturabilecek diğer komünist unsurları da tasfiye edip öldürdüler. Fakat asıl trajediler daha sonra yaşanacaktı; önce İç Savaş’la, ardından Stalin’in kamusallaştırma politikaları ve belki de 40 milyon kadar insanın hayatına mal olan aşırı sıklıktaki tasfiyeleriyle. Rus komünizmi acımasız, baskıcı ve kanlıydı fakat eşsiz değildi. Ekonomik sonuçlar ve çekilen acılar başka yerlerde olup bitenlerle büyük benzerlikler taşıyordu, örneğin 1970’lerde Kızıl Kmerler’in idaresinde Kamboçya’da yaşananlarla; ayrıca Çin’de ve Kuzey Kore’dekilerle. Bu örneklerin tümünde komünizm habis diktatörlükleri ve yaygın insan hakları ihlallerini beraberinde getirdi. Yaşanan ıstıraplar ve katliamlar bir yana, komünist rejimlerin hepsi de farklı türlerde “sömürücü kurumlar inşa ettiler. Ekonomik kurumlar, piyasalar olsun olmasın, halkın kaynaklarını sömürmek için tasarlanmıştı ve mülkiyet haklarından nefret edildiğinden genellikle zenginlik yerine yoksulluk yaratıyorlardı. 5. bölümde gördüğümüz Sovyet örneğinde olduğu gibi, komünist sistem önce hızlı büyüme üretti fakat ardından hızını kaybetti ve durgunluğa yol açtı. Sonuçlar Mao idaresindeki Çin’de, Kızıl Kmerler idaresindeki Kamboçya’da ve komünist ekonomik kurumların ekonomik çöküşe ve kıtlığa yol açtığı Kuzey Kore’de çok daha yıkıcıydı.

Bu komünist ekonomik kurumlar tüm gücü komünist partilerin ellerinde yoğunlaştırıp bu gücün kullanımına hiçbir kısıtlama getirmeyen sömürücü siyasal kurumlar tarafından destekleniyordu. Bunlar şeklen farklı sömürücü kurumlar olsalar da insanların geçim kaynakları üzerinde Zimbabve ve Sierra Leone’deki sömürücü kurumlarla benzer etkiler doğuruyorlardı.

**
Özbekistan pek çok bakımdan geçmişten, unutulmuş bir çağdan kalma bir yadigâr gibi görünür: Tek bir ailenin ve maiyetinin mutlakıyetçiliği altında takati kalmamış, angaryaya –hem de çocukların zorla çalıştırılmasına– dayalı bir ekonomisi olan bir ülke. Fakat aslında öyle değildir. Özbekistan günümüzün sömürücü kurumlar nedeniyle başarısızlığa uğrayan ülkeler mozaiğinin bir parçasıdır ve ne yazık ki Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan’dan; Kırgızistan, Tacikistan ve Türkmenistan’a kadar uzanan eski Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleriyle pek çok ortak noktaya sahiptir ve bize sömürücü ekonomik ve siyasal kurumların 21. yüzyılda bile yüzsüz ve acımasız bir sömürü modeline dönüşebileceğini hatırlatmaktadır.