Child Graves

Beyond living memory, for some reason we avoid reminding ourselves and our children about the miseries and brutalities of the past. The truth is to be found in ancient graveyards and burial sites, where archeologists have to get used to discovering that a large proportion of all the remains they dig up are those of children. Most will have been killed by starvation or disgusting diseases, but many child skeletons bear the marks of physical violence. Hunter-gatherer societies often had murder rates above 10 percent and children were not spared. In today’s graveyards, child graves are rare.

Dogs are wolf at heart

It’s in the Neolithic, when humans start to farm, that dogs also start to spread beyond Eurasia for the first time. And they track the spread of farming. Dogs appear in sub-Saharan Africa after the beginning of the Neolithic there, 5,600 years ago, and take another 4,000 years to reach South Africa. Dogs appear in archaeological sites in Mexico around 5,000 years ago, coinciding with the first farmers there, but only reach the southernmost tip of South America 4,000 years later. Studies of mitochondrial DNA suggested that all those early American dog lineages were completely replaced, following the European colonisation of the Americas. But the latest genome-wide studies tell a different story: European dogs – arriving with colonisers in just the last 500 years – mixed with the indigenous New World dogs.

The modern breeds that we know so well take much longer to arrive. They are very recent inventions. Dog genes reflect this history. There are signs of two prominent genetic bottlenecks amongst the ancestors of dogs: one at the origin of domestication, and another when modern breeds emerged, in just the last 200 years. Breeders began to focus closely on promoting particular traits, producing dogs that were wonderfully obedient, providing invaluable help with hunting and herding. But the malleability of characteristics under selective breeding became an allure in itself, and so dogs were also bred with specific shapes, sizes, colours and textures. The morphological variety amongst modern dog breeds exceeds that in the whole of the rest of the family Canidae, which includes foxes and jackals as well as wolves and dogs.

There are nearly 400 breeds of dogs today, and most of them – in all their wonderful diversity – have really only been around since the nineteenth century. This is when the strict breeding needed to create and conserve the kinds of strains recognised by kennel clubs really got going. The breeds that appear to be most ancient, with the most deep-rooted lineages on the dog family tree, are actually found in places where dogs only arrived relatively recently. Dogs arrived in the islands of south-east Asia 3,500 years ago and in South Africa around 1,400 years ago and yet these areas are home to a number of ‘genetically ancient’ breeds: basenjis, New Guinea singing dogs and dingoes. This pattern shows that these lineages have been isolated for longer than most other breeds. The deep roots don’t mean that their lineages were the first to branch off, but rather that out on the periphery they have stayed the most genetically distinct.

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Lots of breeds with supposedly ancient roots, however, turn out to be recent recreations. Wolfhounds were, as their name suggests, used to hunt their wild cousins – very successfully. By 1786 there were no wolves left in Ireland, and so no need for wolfhounds. By 1840, the Irish wolfhound had also gone extinct. But then a Scotsman living in Gloucestershire, Captain George Augustus Graham, resurrected the ‘Irish wolfhound’ by breeding what he thought was a wolfhound of some kind with Scottish deerhounds. Today’s population of Irish wolfhounds comes from a very small group of ancestors so that, like many breeds, they are inbred. And while this helps to maintain the characteristics of the breed, it also increases the risk of particular diseases with a strong genetic component. Around 40 per cent of Irish wolfhounds suffer from some form of heart disease, and 20 per cent from epilepsy. They’re not the only pedigree with problems. Many dog breeds plummeted to near-extinction in the twentieth century, during the world wars, and were resurrected by outbreeding with other types of dog. Very strict breeding since then has produced extremely inbred populations, with little genetic diversity within breeds and an increased risk of diseases – ranging from heart disease and epilepsy, to blindness and particular cancers. Specific breeds are predisposed to certain afflictions: Dalmatians have a high risk of deafness; Labradors often suffer from hip problems; cocker spaniels are prone to developing cataracts.

Breeds may be relatively reproductively isolated now, but their genes tell us that there was once plenty of gene flow between breeds or proto-breeds. Breeds from separate countries share characteristics and genes which show that they must have interbred in the past. The Mexican hairless dog and the Chinese crested dog share hairlessness and missing teeth and in both breeds these traits are caused by precisely the same mutation in a single gene. The odds against this gene mutating in exactly the same way in two different dog populations are infinitesimally small. Instead, these shared traits and shared genetic signature speak of common ancestry. Dachshunds, corgis and basset hounds all have very short legs. Together with sixteen other dog breeds, they all have exactly the same genetic signature associated with this form of dwarfism – the insertion of an extra gene. It’s most likely that this insertion happened just once, in early dogs, long before any of the modern short-legged breeds appeared.

Genetic research provides us with this astonishing opportunity to understand the evolutionary history of dogs, from the pleiotropic exuberance of variety produced by selecting tameness, right through to the selection of peculiar features, suited to very particular tasks, in our modern breeds. We can see how certain mutations, and the traits associated with them, popped up amongst early dogs, and were later – much later – promoted and propagated by selective breeding to create the modern breeds we know today. With inbreeding producing problems with increased risk of disease, geneticists are also working to understand the basis of particularly prevalent diseases and it may be possible to reduce that risk by even more careful selective breeding, and judicious outcrosses, underpinned by genotyping.

Some breeds have been outcrossed beyond the bounds of domestic dogs. Such extreme outcrossing was the basis of the Saarloos wolfdog, created in 1935 by breeding together a male German shepherd with a female Eur

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Hybrid wolf-dogs have attacked and killed a number of children in the US, and are banned outright in some states. In others, wolf-dog hybrids are legal, as long as the hybridisation happened at least five generations ago. In the UK, a first- or second-generation wolf-dog hybrid is considered risky enough to be regulated by the Dangerous Wild Animals Act – the same law governing owning a lion or tiger. It seems odd that breeders would exaggerate the wolf content of their puppies – but wildness is part of the cachet of these animals. With buyers seeking ‘high-content’ and ‘wild looks’, and willing to part with £5,000 to feel more like Jon Snow, wolf-dog hybrids are big business. It’s difficult to know just how ‘wolfy’ the product of a cross is, several generations down the line. The first-generation animals will be 50:50 in their genes, but after that, the shuffling of DNA that happens as eggs and sperm are made introduces messiness – second-generation wolf-dogs could have up to 75 per cent wolf genes in their genome, or as little as 25 per cent. There’s also the possibility that some purported ‘wolf-dog hybrids’ are nothing of the sort, and are just cross-breeds of German shepherds, huskies and malamutes – which already look fairly wolf-like – to create animals which appear even more like wolves. The ‘wolfiness’ of a wolf-dog hybrid, a few generations after hybridisation, is impossible to pin down without genotyping. And even with that genetic measure of wolfiness, it’s difficult to know how this would relate to the potential behaviour of an individual animal.

There are also concerns about wolf-dog hybrids on the other side as dog genes make their way into the genomes of wild wolves. Genetic studies have shown that 25 per cent of Eurasian wolf genomes contain dog ancestry. This is problematic from a conservation perspective – could an injection of domestic dog genes into wild, grey wolves cause problems for Canis lupus? Wolf populations have declined in Europe, under pressure from both hunting and the fragmentation of habitats. But hybridisation could also supply beneficial genes and traits. North American wolves got their black coat colour by interbreeding with dogs centuries, if not millennia, ago. Most hybridisation appears to occur through free-ranging male dogs mating with female wolves, but one recent study showed up dog mitochondrial DNA in two Latvian wolf-dog hybrids. Mitochondrial DNA is exclusively inherited from the mother, so the only way that this DNA could have ended up in wolf genomes is by female dogs having mated with male wolves. Once dog genes have entered wolf populations, it’s very difficult to remove them. Some hybrids look a bit like dogs, but many look exactly like wild wolves. So experts have advised that the best way of reducing the impact of hybridisation is to reduce the number of free-ranging dogs. Once they mate with wild wolves, it’s too late.

Hybridisation raises all sorts of questions. There are biological questions about the integrity of species, and about just how much interbreeding occurs across our once sacrosanct species boundaries. If there’s plenty of interbreeding, with fertile offspring, does this mean our species boundaries are too narrow? These are widely debated questions right now. But in fact, taxonomists, the people who make it their business to name and circumscribe species, have never been quite as rigid as textbooks may have led us to believe. Species are simply snapshots of evolutionary lineages – diverging (and sometimes converging). They are defined by being diagnosably different from the nearest cousins on the tree of life. But sometimes they are defined for human convenience – especially when it comes to conferring separate species names on domesticates and their wild ancestors.

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The potential for hybridisation also leads to ethical questions about the ‘contamination’ of wild species with genes from domesticated species. Having created domesticated species, we’re now keen to preserve any surviving, closely related wild ones. But does this invoke an idea of the purity of species that just doesn’t really exist in the real world? That’s a challenging question, and one that will only become more pressing as our own population grows, and the species we’ve become allied with burgeon alongside us. It’s such a conundrum. The species that have become our allies have secured their future, by becoming companionable, useful, even indispensable to us. But together, we represent a threat to whatever wildness remains.

It seems that the safest way for humans and wolves to co-exist on the planet is to avoid each other. Our ancestors once tolerated wild wolves – long enough to domesticate them. Wolves may be naturally much more shy around humans now than they were in the past. Wolves were changed by becoming domesticated dogs, in so many ways, but the wild wolves may have changed as well. Persecution and hunting of wild wolves probably exerted a selection pressure of its own – the most successful wolves are likely to have been the ones that stayed away from humans. Wolves that are more fearful, and that avoid us, may be products of human-mediated selection – as much as dogs are.

The genetics of grey wolves and dogs suggests that the wolf lineage which gave rise to dogs is now extinct. Times were tough around the last glacial maximum, so that’s certainly possible. But there’s another way of looking at the family tree – that particular lineage of wolves is not extinct at all; in fact, it’s the most populous branch of the wolf family tree: dogs. Genetically speaking, dogs are grey wolves. Most researchers simply subsume them within the grey wolf species, Canis lupus – not a separate species, the previously recognised Canis familiaris, but a subspecies: Canis lupus familiaris.

So that terrier, that spaniel, that retriever that you know so well … it’s a wolf at heart. But a much friendlier one – even more tail-wagging, hand-licking, and altogether less dangerous – than its wild cousins. 

Human History is the History of Extinction

“The journey of the first humans to Australia is one of the most important events in history, at least as important as Columbus’ journey to America or the Apollo 11 expedition to the moon. It was the first time any human had managed to leave the Afro-Asian ecological system – indeed, the first time any large terrestrial mammal had managed to cross from Afro-Asia to Australia. Of even greater importance was what the human pioneers did in this new world. The moment the first hunter-gatherer set foot on an Australian beach was the moment that Homo sapiens climbed to the top rung in the food chain on a particular landmass and thereafter became the deadliest species in the annals of planet Earth.


Up until then humans had displayed some innovative adaptations and behaviours, but their effect on their environment had been negligible. They had demonstrated remarkable success in moving into and adjusting to various habitats, but they did so without drastically changing those habitats. The settlers of Australia, or more accurately, its conquerors, didn’t just adapt, they transformed the Australian ecosystem beyond recognition.


The first human footprint on a sandy Australian beach was immediately washed away by the waves. Yet when the invaders advanced inland, they left behind a different footprint, one that would never be expunged. As they pushed on, they encountered a strange universe of unknown creatures that included a 200-kilogram, two-metre kangaroo, and a marsupial lion, as massive as a modern tiger, that was the continent’s largest predator. Koalas far too big to be cuddly and cute rustled in the trees and flightless birds twice the size of ostriches sprinted on the plains. Dragon-like lizards and snakes five metres long slithered through the undergrowth. The giant diprotodon, a two-and-a-half-ton wombat, roamed the forests. Except for the birds and reptiles, all these animals were marsupials – like kangaroos, they gave birth to tiny, helpless, fetus-like young which they then nurtured with milk in abdominal pouches. Marsupial mammals were almost unknown in Africa and Asia, but in Australia they reigned supreme.

Within a few thousand years, virtually all of these giants vanished. Of the twenty-four Australian animal species weighing fifty kilograms or more, twenty-three became extinct.2 A large number of smaller species also disappeared. Food chains throughout the entire Australian ecosystem were broken and rearranged. It was the most important transformation of the Australian ecosystem for millions of years. 

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The settling of America was hardly bloodless. It left behind a long trail of victims. American fauna 14,000 years ago was far richer than it is today. When the first Americans marched south from Alaska into the plains of Canada and the western United States, they encountered mammoths and mastodons, rodents the size of bears, herds of horses and camels, oversized lions and dozens of large species the likes of which are completely unknown today, among them fearsome sabre-tooth cats and giant ground sloths that weighed up to eight tons and reached a height of six metres. South America hosted an even more exotic menagerie of large mammals, reptiles and birds. The Americas were a great laboratory of evolutionary experimentation, a place where animals and plants unknown in Africa and Asia had evolved and thrived.

But no longer. Within 2,000 years of the Sapiens arrival, most of these unique species were gone. According to current estimates, within that short interval, North America lost thirty-four out of its forty-seven genera of large mammals. South America lost fifty out of sixty. The sabre-tooth cats, after flourishing for more than 30 million years, disappeared, and so did the giant ground sloths, the oversized lions, native American horses, native American camels, the giant rodents and the mammoths. Thousands of species of smaller mammals, reptiles, birds, and even insects and parasites also became extinct (when the mammoths died out, all species of mammoth ticks followed them to oblivion).

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If we combine the mass extinctions in Australia and America, and add the smaller-scale extinctions that took place as Homo sapiens spread over Afro-Asia – such as the extinction of all other human species – and the extinctions that occurred when ancient foragers settled remote islands such as Cuba, the inevitable conclusion is that the first wave of Sapiens colonisation was one of the biggest and swiftest ecological disasters to befall the animal kingdom. Hardest hit were the large furry creatures. At the time of the Cognitive Revolution, the planet was home to about 200 genera of large terrestrial mammals weighing over fifty kilograms. At the time of the Agricultural Revolution, only about a hundred remained. Homo sapiens drove to extinction about half of the planet’s big beasts long before humans invented the wheel, writing, or iron tools.

This ecological tragedy was restaged in miniature countless times after the Agricultural Revolution. The archaeological record of island after island tells the same sad story. The tragedy opens with a scene showing a rich and varied population of large animals, without any trace of humans. In scene two, Sapiens appear, evidenced by a human bone, a spear point, or “perhaps a potsherd. Scene three quickly follows, in which men and women occupy centre stage and most large animals, along with many smaller ones, are gone.

The large island of Madagascar, about 400 kilometres east of the African mainland, offers a famous example. Through millions of years of isolation, a unique collection of animals evolved there. These included the elephant bird, a flightless creature three metres tall and weighing almost half a ton – the largest bird in the world – and the giant lemurs, the globe’s largest primates. The elephant birds and the giant lemurs, along with most of the other large animals of Madagascar, suddenly vanished about 1,500 years ago – precisely when the first humans set foot on the island.

In the Pacific Ocean, the main wave of extinction began in about 1500 BC, when Polynesian farmers settled the Solomon Islands, Fiji and New Caledonia. They killed off, directly or indirectly, hundreds of species of birds, insects, snails and other local inhabitants. From there, the wave of extinction moved gradually to the east, the south and the north, into the heart of the Pacific Ocean, obliterating on its way the unique fauna of Samoa and Tonga (1200 BC); the Marquis Islands (AD 1); Easter Island, the Cook Islands and Hawaii (AD 500); and finally New Zealand (AD 1200).

Similar ecological disasters occurred on almost every one of the thousands of islands that pepper the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Arctic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. 

Archaeologists have discovered on even the tiniest islands evidence of the existence of birds, insects and snails that lived there for countless generations, only to vanish when the first human farmers arrived. None but a few extremely remote islands escaped man’s notice until the modern age, and these islands kept their fauna intact. The Galapagos Islands, to give one famous example, remained uninhabited by humans until the nineteenth century, thus preserving their unique menagerie, including their giant tortoises, which, like the ancient diprotodons, show no fear of humans.

The First Wave Extinction, which accompanied the spread of the foragers, was followed by the Second Wave Extinction, which accompanied the spread of the farmers, and gives us an important perspective on the Third Wave Extinction, which industrial activity is causing today. Don’t believe tree-huggers who claim that our ancestors lived in harmony with nature. Long before the Industrial Revolution, Homo sapiens held the record among all organisms for driving the most plant and animal species to their extinctions. We have the dubious distinction of being the deadliest species in the annals of biology.

Perhaps if more people were aware of the First Wave and Second Wave extinctions, they’d be less nonchalant about the Third Wave they are part of. If we knew how many species we’ve already eradicated, we might be more motivated to protect those that still survive. This is especially relevant to the large animals of the oceans. Unlike their terrestrial counterparts, the large sea animals suffered relatively little from the Cognitive and Agricultural Revolutions. But many of them are on the brink of extinction now as a result of industrial pollution and human overuse of oceanic resources. If things continue at the present pace, it is likely that whales, sharks, tuna and dolphins will follow the diprotodons, ground sloths and mammoths to oblivion. Among all the world’s large creatures, the only survivors of the human flood will be humans themselves, and the farmyard animals that serve as galley slaves in Noah’s Ark. 

The Foragers

Most Sapiens bands lived on the road, roaming from place to place in search of food. Their movements were influenced by the changing seasons, the annual migrations of animals and the growth cycles of plants. They usually travelled back and forth across the same home territory, an area of between several dozen and many hundreds of square kilometres.

Occasionally, bands wandered outside their turf and explored new lands, whether due to natural calamities, violent conflicts, demographic pressures or the initiative of a charismatic leader. These wanderings were the engine of human worldwide expansion. If a forager band split once every forty years and its splinter group migrated to a new territory a hundred kilometres to the east, the distance from East Africa to China would have been covered in about 10,000 years.

In some exceptional cases, when food sources were particularly rich, bands settled down in seasonal and even permanent camps. Techniques for drying, smoking and freezing food also made it possible to stay put for longer periods. Most importantly, alongside seas and rivers rich in seafood and waterfowl, humans set up permanent fishing villages – the first permanent settlements in history, long predating the Agricultural Revolution. Fishing villages might have appeared on the coasts of Indonesian islands as early as 45,000 years ago. These may have been the base from which Homo sapiens launched its first transoceanic enterprise: the invasion of Australia.

In most habitats, Sapiens bands fed themselves in an elastic and opportunistic fashion. They scrounged for termites, picked berries, dug for roots, stalked rabbits and hunted bison and mammoth. Notwithstanding the popular image of ‘man the hunter’, gathering was Sapiens’ main activity, and it provided most of their calories, as well as raw materials such as flint, wood and bamboo.

Sapiens did not forage only for food and materials. They foraged for knowledge as well. To survive, they needed a detailed mental map of their territory. To maximise the efficiency of their daily search for food, they required information about the growth patterns of each plant and the habits of each animal. They needed to know which foods were nourishing, which made you sick, and how to use others as cures. They needed to know the progress of the seasons and what warning signs preceded a thunderstorm or a dry spell. 

They studied every stream, every walnut tree, every bear cave, and every flint-stone deposit in their vicinity. Each individual had to understand how to make a stone knife, how to mend a torn cloak, how to lay a rabbit trap, and how to face avalanches, snakebites or hungry lions. Mastery of each of these many skills required years of apprenticeship and practice. The average ancient forager could turn a flint stone into a spear point within minutes. When we try to imitate this feat, we usually fail miserably. Most of us lack expert knowledge of the flaking properties of flint and basalt and the fine motor skills needed to work them precisely.

In other words, the average forager had wider, deeper and more varied knowledge of her immediate surroundings than most of her modern descendants. Today, most people in industrial societies don’t need to know much about the natural world in order to survive. What do you really need to know in order to get by as a computer engineer, an insurance agent, a history teacher or a factory worker? You need to know a lot about your own tiny field of expertise, but for the vast majority of life’s necessities you rely blindly on the help of other experts, whose own knowledge is also limited to a tiny field of expertise. The human collective knows far more today than did the ancient bands. But at the individual level, ancient foragers were the most knowledgeable and skilful people in history.

There is some evidence that the size of the average Sapiens brain has actually decreased since the age of foraging. Survival in that era required superb mental abilities from everyone. When agriculture and industry came along people could increasingly rely on the skills of others for survival, and new ‘niches for imbeciles’ were opened up. You could survive and pass your unremarkable genes to the next generation by working as a water carrier or an assembly-line worker.

Foragers mastered not only the surrounding world of animals, plants and objects, but also the internal world of their own bodies and senses. They listened to the slightest movement in the grass to learn whether a snake might be lurking there. They carefully observed the foliage of trees in order to discover fruits, beehives and bird nests. They moved with a minimum of effort and noise, and knew how to sit, walk and run in the most agile and efficient manner. Varied and constant use of their bodies made them as fit as marathon runners. They had physical dexterity that people today are unable to achieve even after years of practising yoga or t’ai chi.

The hunter-gatherer way of life differed significantly from region to region and from season to season, but  “on the whole foragers seem to have enjoyed a more comfortable and rewarding lifestyle than most of the peasants, shepherds, labourers and office clerks who followed in their footsteps.

While people in today’s affluent societies work an average of forty to forty-five hours a week, and people in the developing world work sixty and even eighty hours a week, hunter-gatherers living today in the most inhospitable of habitats – such as the Kalahari Desert work on average for just thirty-five to forty-five hours a week. They hunt only one day out of three, and gathering takes up just three to six hours daily. In normal times, this is enough to feed the band. It may well be that ancient hunter-gatherers living in zones more fertile than the Kalahari spent even less time obtaining food and raw materials. On top of that, foragers enjoyed a lighter load of household chores. They had no dishes to wash, no carpets to vacuum, no floors to polish, no nappies to change and no bills to pay.

The forager economy provided most people with more interesting lives than agriculture or industry do.  Today, a Chinese factory hand leaves home around seven in the morning, makes her way through polluted streets to a sweatshop, and there operates the same machine, in the same way, day in, day out, for ten long and mind-numbing hours, returning home around seven in the evening in order to wash dishes and do the laundry. Thirty thousand years ago, a Chinese forager might leave camp with her companions at, say, eight in the morning. They’d roam the nearby forests and meadows, gathering mushrooms, digging up edible roots, catching frogs and occasionally running away from tigers. By early afternoon, they were back at the camp to make lunch. That left them plenty of time to gossip, tell stories, play with the children and just hang out. Of course the tigers sometimes caught them, or a snake bit them, but on the other hand they didn’t have to deal with automobile accidents and industrial pollution.

In most places and at most times, foraging provided ideal nutrition. That is hardly surprising – this had been the human diet for hundreds of thousands of years, and the human body was well adapted to it. Evidence from fossilised skeletons indicates that ancient foragers were less likely to suffer from starvation or malnutrition, and were generally taller and healthier than their peasant descendants. Average life expectancy was apparently just thirty to forty years, but this was due largely to the high incidence of child mortality. Children who made it through the perilous first years had a good chance of reaching the age of sixty, and some even made it to their eighties. Among modern foragers, forty-five-year-old women can  “expect to live another twenty years, and about 5–8 per cent of the population is over sixty.

The foragers’ secret of success, which protected them from starvation and malnutrition, was their varied diet. Farmers tend to eat a very limited and unbalanced diet. Especially in premodern times, most of the calories feeding an agricultural population came from a single crop – such as wheat, potatoes or rice – that lacks some of the vitamins, minerals and other nutritional materials humans need. The typical peasant in traditional China ate rice for breakfast, rice for lunch, and rice for dinner. If she were lucky, she could expect to eat the same on the following day. By contrast, ancient foragers regularly ate dozens of different foodstuffs. The peasant’s ancient ancestor, the forager, may have eaten berries and mushrooms for breakfast; fruits, snails and turtle for lunch; and rabbit steak with wild onions for dinner. Tomorrows menu might have been completely different. This variety ensured that the ancient foragers received all the necessary nutrients.

Furthermore, by not being dependent on any single kind of food, they were less liable to suffer when one particular food source failed. Agricultural societies are ravaged by famine when drought, fire or earthquake devastates the annual rice or potato crop. Forager societies were hardly immune to natural disasters, and suffered from periods of want and hunger, but they were usually able to deal with such calamities more easily. If they lost some of their staple foodstuffs, they could gather or hunt other species, or move to a less affected area.

Ancient foragers also suffered less from infectious diseases. Most of the infectious diseases that have plagued agricultural and industrial societies (such as smallpox, measles and tuberculosis) originated in domesticated animals and were transferred to humans only after the Agricultural Revolution. Ancient foragers, who had domesticated only dogs, were free of these scourges. Moreover, most people in agricultural and industrial societies lived in dense, unhygienic permanent settlements – ideal hotbeds for disease. Foragers roamed the land in small bands that could not sustain epidemics.

The wholesome and varied diet, the relatively short working week, and the rarity of infectious diseases have led many experts to define pre-agricultural forager societies as ‘the original affluent societies’. It would be a mistake, however, to idealise the lives of these ancients. Though they lived better lives than most people in agricultural and industrial societies, their world could still be harsh and unforgiving. Periods of want and hardship were not uncommon, child  mortality was high, and an accident which would be minor today could easily become a death sentence. Most people probably enjoyed the close intimacy of the roaming band, but those unfortunates who incurred the hostility or mockery of their fellow band members probably suffered terribly. Modern foragers occasionally abandon and even kill old or disabled people who cannot keep up with the band. Unwanted babies and children may be slain, and there are even cases of religiously inspired human sacrifice.

The Aché people, hunter-gatherers who lived in the jungles of Paraguay until the 1960s, offer a glimpse into the darker side of foraging. When a valued band member died, the Aché customarily killed a little girl and buried the two together. Anthropologists who interviewed the Aché recorded a case in which a band abandoned a middle-aged man who fell sick and was unable to keep up with the others. He was left under a tree. Vultures perched above him, expecting a hearty meal. But the man recuperated, and, walking briskly, he managed to rejoin the band. His body was covered with the birds’ faeces, so he was henceforth nicknamed ‘Vulture Droppings’.

When an old Aché woman became a burden to the rest of the band, one of the younger men would sneak behind her and kill her with an axe-blow to the head. An Aché man told the inquisitive anthropologists stories of his prime years in the jungle. ‘I customarily killed old women. I used to kill my aunts … The women were afraid of me … Now, here with the whites, I have become weak.’ Babies born without hair, who were considered underdeveloped, were killed immediately. One woman recalled that her first baby girl was killed because the men in the band did not want another girl. On another occasion a man killed a small boy because he was ‘in a bad mood and the child was crying’. Another child was buried alive because ‘it was funny-looking and the other children laughed at it’.

We should be careful, though, not to judge the Aché too quickly. Anthropologists who lived with them for years report that violence between adults was very rare. Both women and men were free to change partners at will. They smiled and laughed constantly, had no leadership hierarchy, and generally shunned domineering people. They were extremely generous with their few possessions, and were not obsessed with success or wealth. The things they valued most in life were good social interactions and high-quality friendships. They viewed the killing of children, sick people and the elderly as many people today view abortion and euthanasia. It should also be noted that the Aché were hunted and killed without mercy by Paraguayan farmers. The need to evade their enemies probably caused the Aché to adopt an exceptionally harsh attitude towards anyone who might become a liability to the band.

The truth is that Aché society, like every human society, was very complex. We should beware of demonising or idealising it on the basis of a superficial acquaintance. The Aché were neither angels nor fiends – they were humans. So, too, were the ancient hunter-gatherers.

Why religion is not going away and science will not destroy it

Peter Harrison, Aeon

In 1966, just over 50 years ago, the distinguished Canadian-born anthropologist Anthony Wallace confidently predicted the global demise of religion at the hands of an advancing science: ‘belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as a result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge’. Wallace’s vision was not exceptional. On the contrary, the modern social sciences, which took shape in 19th-century western Europe, took their own recent historical experience of secularisation as a universal model. An assumption lay at the core of the social sciences, either presuming or sometimes predicting that all cultures would eventually converge on something roughly approximating secular, Western, liberal democracy. Then something closer to the opposite happened.

Not only has secularism failed to continue its steady global march but countries as varied as Iran, India, Israel, Algeria and Turkey have either had their secular governments replaced by religious ones, or have seen the rise of influential religious nationalist movements. Secularisation, as predicted by the social sciences, has failed.

To be sure, this failure is not unqualified. Many Western countries continue to witness decline in religious belief and practice. The most recent census data released in Australia, for example, shows that 30 per cent of the population identify as having ‘no religion’, and that this percentage is increasing. International surveys confirm comparatively low levels of religious commitment in western Europe and Australasia. Even the United States, a long-time source of embarrassment for the secularisation thesis, has seen a rise in unbelief. The percentage of atheists in the US now sits at an all-time high (if ‘high’ is the right word) of around 3 per cent. Yet, for all that, globally, the total number of people who consider themselves to be religious remains high, and demographic trends suggest that the overall pattern for the immediate future will be one of religious growth. But this isn’t the only failure of the secularisation thesis.

Scientists, intellectuals and social scientists expected that the spread of modern science would drive secularisation – that science would be a secularising force. But that simply hasn’t been the case. If we look at those societies where religion remains vibrant, their key common features are less to do with science, and more to do with feelings of existential security and protection from some of the basic uncertainties of life in the form of public goods. A social safety net might be correlated with scientific advances but only loosely, and again the case of the US is instructive. The US is arguably the most scientifically and technologically advanced society in the world, and yet at the same time the most religious of Western societies. As the British sociologist David Martin concluded in The Future of Christianity (2011): ‘There is no consistent relation between the degree of scientific advance and a reduced profile of religious influence, belief and practice.’

The story of science and secularisation becomes even more intriguing when we consider those societies that have witnessed significant reactions against secularist agendas. India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru championed secular and scientific ideals, and enlisted scientific education in the project of modernisation. Nehru was confident that Hindu visions of a Vedic past and Muslim dreams of an Islamic theocracy would both succumb to the inexorable historical march of secularisation. ‘There is only one-way traffic in Time,’ he declared. But as the subsequent rise of Hindu and Islamic fundamentalism adequately attests, Nehru was wrong. Moreover, the association of science with a secularising agenda has backfired, with science becoming a collateral casualty of resistance to secularism.

Turkey provides an even more revealing case. Like most pioneering nationalists, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish republic, was a committed secularist. Atatürk believed that science was destined to displace religion. In order to make sure that Turkey was on the right side of history, he gave science, in particular evolutionary biology, a central place in the state education system of the fledgling Turkish republic. As a result, evolution came to be associated with Atatürk’s entire political programme, including secularism. Islamist parties in Turkey, seeking to counter the secularist ideals of the nation’s founders, have also attacked the teaching of evolution. For them, evolution is associated with secular materialism. This sentiment culminated in the decision this June to remove the teaching of evolution from the high-school classroom. Again, science has become a victim of guilt by association.

The US represents a different cultural context, where it might seem that the key issue is a conflict between literal readings of Genesis and key features of evolutionary history. But in fact, much of the creationist discourse centres on moral values. In the US case too, we see anti-evolutionism motivated at least in part by the assumption that evolutionary theory is a stalking horse for secular materialism and its attendant moral commitments. As in India and Turkey, secularism is actually hurting science.

In brief, global secularisation is not inevitable and, when it does happen, it is not caused by science. Further, when the attempt is made to use science to advance secularism, the results can damage science. The thesis that ‘science causes secularisation’ simply fails the empirical test, and enlisting science as an instrument of secularisation turns out to be poor strategy. The science and secularism pairing is so awkward that it raises the question: why did anyone think otherwise?

Historically, two related sources advanced the idea that science would displace religion. First, 19th-century progressivist conceptions of history, particularly associated with the French philosopher Auguste Comte, held to a theory of history in which societies pass through three stages – religious, metaphysical and scientific (or ‘positive’). Comte coined the term ‘sociology’ and he wanted to diminish the social influence of religion and replace it with a new science of society. Comte’s influence extended to the ‘young Turks’ and Atatürk.

The 19th century also witnessed the inception of the ‘conflict model’ of science and religion. This was the view that history can be understood in terms of a ‘conflict between two epochs in the evolution of human thought – the theological and the scientific’. This description comes from Andrew Dickson White’s influential A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896), the title of which nicely encapsulates its author’s general theory. White’s work, as well as John William Draper’s earlier History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science (1874), firmly established the conflict thesis as the default way of thinking about the historical relations between science and religion. Both works were translated into multiple languages. Draper’s History went through more than 50 printings in the US alone, was translated into 20 languages and, notably, became a bestseller in the late Ottoman empire, where it informed Atatürk’s understanding that progress meant science superseding religion.

Today, people are less confident that history moves through a series of set stages toward a single destination. Nor, despite its popular persistence, do most historians of science support the idea of an enduring conflict between science and religion. Renowned collisions, such as the Galileo affair, turned on politics and personalities, not just science and religion. Darwin had significant religious supporters and scientific detractors, as well as vice versa. Many other alleged instances of science-religion conflict have now been exposed as pure inventions. In fact, contrary to conflict, the historical norm has more often been one of mutual support between science and religion. In its formative years in the 17th century, modern science relied on religious legitimation. During the 18th and 19th centuries, natural theology helped to popularise science.

The conflict model of science and religion offered a mistaken view of the past and, when combined with expectations of secularisation, led to a flawed vision of the future. Secularisation theory failed at both description and prediction. The real question is why we continue to encounter proponents of science-religion conflict. Many are prominent scientists. It would be superfluous to rehearse Richard Dawkins’s musings on this topic, but he is by no means a solitary voice. Stephen Hawking thinks that ‘science will win because it works’; Sam Harris has declared that ‘science must destroy religion’; Stephen Weinberg thinks that science has weakened religious certitude; Colin Blakemore predicts that science will eventually make religion unnecessary. Historical evidence simply does not support such contentions. Indeed, it suggests that they are misguided.

So why do they persist? The answers are political. Leaving aside any lingering fondness for quaint 19th-century understandings of history, we must look to the fear of Islamic fundamentalism, exasperation with creationism, an aversion to alliances between the religious Right and climate-change denial, and worries about the erosion of scientific authority. While we might be sympathetic to these concerns, there is no disguising the fact that they arise out of an unhelpful intrusion of normative commitments into the discussion. Wishful thinking – hoping that science will vanquish religion – is no substitute for a sober assessment of present realities. Continuing with this advocacy is likely to have an effect opposite to that intended.

Religion is not going away any time soon, and science will not destroy it. If anything, it is science that is subject to increasing threats to its authority and social legitimacy. Given this, science needs all the friends it can get. Its advocates would be well advised to stop fabricating an enemy out of religion, or insisting that the only path to a secure future lies in a marriage of science and secularism.

America's Population Before Columbus

On May 30, 1539, Hernando de Soto landed his private army near Tampa Bay, in Florida. Soto, as he was called, was a novel figure: half warrior, half venture capitalist. He had grown very rich very young by becoming a market leader in the nascent trade for Indian slaves. The profits had helped to fund Pizarro's seizure of the Incan empire, which had made Soto wealthier still. Looking quite literally for new worlds to conquer, he persuaded the Spanish Crown to let him loose in North America. He spent one fortune to make another. He came to Florida with 200 horses, 600 soldiers, and 300 pigs.

From today's perspective, it is difficult to imagine the ethical system that would justify Soto's actions. For four years his force, looking for gold, wandered through what is now Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas, wrecking almost everything it touched. The inhabitants often fought back vigorously, but they had never before encountered an army with horses and guns. Soto died of fever with his expedition in ruins; along the way his men had managed to rape, torture, enslave, and kill countless Indians. But the worst thing the Spaniards did, some researchers say, was entirely without malice—bring the pigs.

According to Charles Hudson, an anthropologist at the University of Georgia who spent fifteen years reconstructing the path of the expedition, Soto crossed the Mississippi a few miles downstream from the present site of Memphis. It was a nervous passage: the Spaniards were watched by several thousand Indian warriors. Utterly without fear, Soto brushed past the Indian force into what is now eastern Arkansas, through thickly settled land—"very well peopled with large towns," one of his men later recalled, "two or three of which were to be seen from one town." Eventually the Spaniards approached a cluster of small cities, each protected by earthen walls, sizeable moats, and deadeye archers. In his usual fashion, Soto brazenly marched in, stole food, and marched out.

After Soto left, no Europeans visited this part of the Mississippi Valley for more than a century. Early in 1682 whites appeared again, this time Frenchmen in canoes. One of them was Réné-Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle. The French passed through the area where Soto had found cities cheek by jowl. It was deserted—La Salle didn't see an Indian village for 200 miles. About fifty settlements existed in this strip of the Mississippi when Soto showed up, according to Anne Ramenofsky, an anthropologist at the University of New Mexico. By La Salle's time the number had shrunk to perhaps ten, some probably inhabited by recent immigrants. Soto "had a privileged glimpse" of an Indian world, Hudson says. "The window opened and slammed shut. When the French came in and the record opened up again, it was a transformed reality. A civilization crumbled. The question is, how did this happen?"

The question is even more complex than it may seem. Disaster of this magnitude suggests epidemic disease. In the view of Ramenofsky and Patricia Galloway, an anthropologist at the University of Texas, the source of the contagion was very likely not Soto's army but its ambulatory meat locker: his 300 pigs. Soto's force itself was too small to be an effective biological weapon. Sicknesses like measles and smallpox would have burned through his 600 soldiers long before they reached the Mississippi. But the same would not have held true for the pigs, which multiplied rapidly and were able to transmit their diseases to wildlife in the surrounding forest. When human beings and domesticated animals live close together, they trade microbes with abandon. Over time mutation spawns new diseases: avian influenza becomes human influenza, bovine rinderpest becomes measles. Unlike Europeans, Indians did not live in close quarters with animals—they domesticated only the dog, the llama, the alpaca, the guinea pig, and, here and there, the turkey and the Muscovy duck. In some ways this is not surprising: the New World had fewer animal candidates for taming than the Old. Moreover, few Indians carry the gene that permits adults to digest lactose, a form of sugar abundant in milk. Non-milk-drinkers, one imagines, would be less likely to work at domesticating milk-giving animals. But this is guesswork. The fact is that what scientists call zoonotic disease was little known in the Americas. Swine alone can disseminate anthrax, brucellosis, leptospirosis, taeniasis, trichinosis, and tuberculosis. Pigs breed exuberantly and can transmit diseases to deer and turkeys. Only a few of Soto's pigs would have had to wander off to infect the forest.

Indeed, the calamity wrought by Soto apparently extended across the whole Southeast. The Coosa city-states, in western Georgia, and the Caddoan-speaking civilization, centered on the Texas-Arkansas border, disintegrated soon after Soto appeared. The Caddo had had a taste for monumental architecture: public plazas, ceremonial platforms, mausoleums. After Soto's army left, notes Timothy K. Perttula, an archaeological consultant in Austin, Texas, the Caddo stopped building community centers and began digging community cemeteries. Between Soto's and La Salle's visits, Perttula believes, the Caddoan population fell from about 200,000 to about 8,500—a drop of nearly 96 percent.

In the eighteenth century the tally shrank further, to 1,400. An equivalent loss today in the population of New York City would reduce it to 56,000—not enough to fill Yankee Stadium. "That's one reason whites think of Indians as nomadic hunters," says Russell Thornton, an anthropologist at the University of California at Los Angeles. "Everything else—all the heavily populated urbanized societies—was wiped out."

Could a few pigs truly wreak this much destruction? Such apocalyptic scenarios invite skepticism. As a rule, viruses, microbes, and parasites are rarely lethal on so wide a scale—a pest that wipes out its host species does not have a bright evolutionary future. In its worst outbreak, from 1347 to 1351, the European Black Death claimed only a third of its victims. (The rest survived, though they were often disfigured or crippled by its effects.) The Indians in Soto's path, if Dobyns, Ramenofsky, and Perttula are correct, endured losses that were incomprehensibly greater.

One reason is that Indians were fresh territory for many plagues, not just one. Smallpox, typhoid, bubonic plague, influenza, mumps, measles, whooping cough—all rained down on the Americas in the century after Columbus. (Cholera, malaria, and scarlet fever came later.) Having little experience with epidemic diseases, Indians had no knowledge of how to combat them. In contrast, Europeans were well versed in the brutal logic of quarantine. They boarded up houses in which plague appeared and fled to the countryside. In Indian New England, Neal Salisbury, a historian at Smith College, wrote in Manitou and Providence (1982), family and friends gathered with the shaman at the sufferer's bedside to wait out the illness—a practice that "could only have served to spread the disease more rapidly."

**
Human history, in Crosby's interpretation, is marked by two world-altering centers of invention: the Middle East and central Mexico, where Indian groups independently created nearly all of the Neolithic innovations, writing included. The Neolithic Revolution began in the Middle East about 10,000 years ago. In the next few millennia humankind invented the wheel, the metal tool, and agriculture. The Sumerians eventually put these inventions together, added writing, and became the world's first civilization. Afterward Sumeria's heirs in Europe and Asia frantically copied one another's happiest discoveries; innovations ricocheted from one corner of Eurasia to another, stimulating technological progress. Native Americans, who had crossed to Alaska before Sumeria, missed out on the bounty. "They had to do everything on their own," Crosby says. Remarkably, they succeeded.

When Columbus appeared in the Caribbean, the descendants of the world's two Neolithic civilizations collided, with overwhelming consequences for both. American Neolithic development occurred later than that of the Middle East, possibly because the Indians needed more time to build up the requisite population density. Without beasts of burden they could not capitalize on the wheel (for individual workers on uneven terrain skids are nearly as effective as carts for hauling), and they never developed steel. But in agriculture they handily outstripped the children of Sumeria. Every tomato in Italy, every potato in Ireland, and every hot pepper in Thailand came from this hemisphere. Worldwide, more than half the crops grown today were initially developed in the Americas.

Maize, as corn is called in the rest of the world, was a triumph with global implications. Indians developed an extraordinary number of maize varieties for different growing conditions, which meant that the crop could and did spread throughout the planet. Central and Southern Europeans became particularly dependent on it; maize was the staple of Serbia, Romania, and Moldavia by the nineteenth century. Indian crops dramatically reduced hunger, Crosby says, which led to an Old World population boom.

Along with peanuts and manioc, maize came to Africa and transformed agriculture there, too. "The probability is that the population of Africa was greatly increased because of maize and other American Indian crops," Crosby says. "Those extra people helped make the slave trade possible." Maize conquered Africa at the time when introduced diseases were leveling Indian societies. The Spanish, the Portuguese, and the British were alarmed by the death rate among Indians, because they wanted to exploit them as workers. Faced with a labor shortage, the Europeans turned their eyes to Africa. The continent's quarrelsome societies helped slave traders to siphon off millions of people. The maize-fed population boom, Crosby believes, let the awful trade continue without pumping the well dry.

Back home in the Americas, Indian agriculture long sustained some of the world's largest cities. The Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán dazzled Hernán Cortés in 1519; it was bigger than Paris, Europe's greatest metropolis. The Spaniards gawped like hayseeds at the wide streets, ornately carved buildings, and markets bright with goods from hundreds of miles away. They had never before seen a city with botanical gardens, for the excellent reason that none existed in Europe. The same novelty attended the force of a thousand men that kept the crowded streets immaculate. (Streets that weren't ankle-deep in sewage! The conquistadors had never heard of such a thing.) Central America was not the only locus of prosperity. Thousands of miles north, John Smith, of Pocahontas fame, visited Massachusetts in 1614, before it was emptied by disease, and declared that the land was "so planted with Gardens and Corne fields, and so well inhabited with a goodly, strong and well proportioned people ... [that] I would rather live here than any where."

Smith was promoting colonization, and so had reason to exaggerate. But he also knew the hunger, sickness, and oppression of European life. France—"by any standards a privileged country," according to its great historian, Fernand Braudel—experienced seven nationwide famines in the fifteenth century and thirteen in the sixteenth. Disease was hunger's constant companion. During epidemics in London the dead were heaped onto carts "like common dung" (the simile is Daniel Defoe's) and trundled through the streets. The infant death rate in London orphanages, according to one contemporary source, was 88 percent. Governments were harsh, the rule of law arbitrary. The gibbets poking up in the background of so many old paintings were, Braudel observed, "merely a realistic detail."

**
The Earth Shall Weep, James Wilson's history of Indian America, puts the comparison bluntly: "the western hemisphere was larger, richer, and more populous than Europe." Much of it was freer, too. Europeans, accustomed to the serfdom that thrived from Naples to the Baltic Sea, were puzzled and alarmed by the democratic spirit and respect for human rights in many Indian societies, especially those in North America. In theory, the sachems of New England Indian groups were absolute monarchs. In practice, the colonial leader Roger Williams wrote, "they will not conclude of ought ... unto which the people are averse."

Pre-1492 America wasn't a disease-free paradise, Dobyns says, although in his "exuberance as a writer," he told me recently, he once made that claim. Indians had ailments of their own, notably parasites, tuberculosis, and anemia. The daily grind was wearing; life-spans in America were only as long as or a little longer than those in Europe, if the evidence of indigenous graveyards is to be believed. Nor was it a political utopia—the Inca, for instance, invented refinements to totalitarian rule that would have intrigued Stalin. Inveterate practitioners of what the historian Francis Jennings described as "state terrorism practiced horrifically on a huge scale," the Inca ruled so cruelly that one can speculate that their surviving subjects might actually have been better off under Spanish rule.

I asked seven anthropologists, archaeologists, and historians if they would rather have been a typical Indian or a typical European in 1491. None was delighted by the question, because it required judging the past by the standards of today—a fallacy disparaged as "presentism" by social scientists. But every one chose to be an Indian. Some early colonists gave the same answer. Horrifying the leaders of Jamestown and Plymouth, scores of English ran off to live with the Indians.

As for the Indians, evidence suggests that they often viewed Europeans with disdain. The Hurons, a chagrined missionary reported, thought the French possessed "little intelligence in comparison to themselves." Europeans, Indians said, were physically weak, sexually untrustworthy, atrociously ugly, and just plain dirty. (Spaniards, who seldom if ever bathed, were amazed by the Aztec desire for personal cleanliness.) A Jesuit reported that the "Savages" were disgusted by handkerchiefs: "They say, we place what is unclean in a fine white piece of linen, and put it away in our pockets as something very precious, while they throw it upon the ground." The Micmac scoffed at the notion of French superiority. If Christian civilization was so wonderful, why were its inhabitants leaving?

Like people everywhere, Indians survived by cleverly exploiting their environment. Europeans tended to manage land by breaking it into fragments for farmers and herders. Indians often worked on such a grand scale that the scope of their ambition can be hard to grasp. They created small plots, as Europeans did (about 1.5 million acres of terraces still exist in the Peruvian Andes), but they also reshaped entire landscapes to suit their purposes. A principal tool was fire, used to keep down underbrush and create the open, grassy conditions favorable for game. Rather than domesticating animals for meat, Indians retooled whole ecosystems to grow bumper crops of elk, deer, and bison.

The first white settlers in Ohio found forests as open as English parks—they could drive carriages through the woods. Along the Hudson River the annual fall burning lit up the banks for miles on end; so flashy was the show that the Dutch in New Amsterdam boated upriver to goggle at the blaze like children at fireworks. In North America, Indian torches had their biggest impact on the Midwestern prairie, much or most of which was created and maintained by fire. Millennia of exuberant burning shaped the plains into vast buffalo farms. When Indian societies disintegrated, forest invaded savannah in Wisconsin, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Texas Hill Country. Is it possible that the Indians changed the Americas more than the invading Europeans did? "The answer is probably yes for most regions for the next 250 years or so" after Columbus, William Denevan wrote, "and for some regions right up to the present time."

Source: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/03/1491/302445/

İlkel Toplumlar 2

“Bugün biliyoruz ki “ilkel” diye nitelenen, tarımı ve hayvancılığı bilmeyen ya da yalnızca ilkel bir tarımla uğraşan, kimi zaman çömlekçilik ve dokumadan da bihaber olan, esasen avcılık ve balıkçılıkla uğraşan, doğadaki şeyleri toplayarak geçinen halklar, ne açlıktan ölme korkusuna ne de düşman bir ortamda yaşamlarını sürdüremeyecekleri endişesine kapılır.

Nüfuslarının az olması, doğal kaynaklar konusundaki olağanüstü bilgileri, bizim “bolluk” demeye dilimizin pek varmayacağı bir ortamda yaşamalarını mümkün kılar. Bununla beraber –Avustralya, Güney Amerika, Melanezya ve Afrika’da yürütülen titiz çalışmaların gösterdiği üzere– aktif aile üyelerinin iki ila dört saatlik günlük çalışması, besin üretimine katılmayan çocuklar ve yaşlılar da dahil bütün ailenin geçimini sağlamaya yetiyor da artıyor bile. Çağdaşlarımızın fabrikalarda ya da bürolarda geçirdiği sürelerle arada ne büyük bir fark var, değil mi!”

**

“XIX. yüzyılda temas kurduğumuzda karşımıza çıktıkları hal için “geri kalmış” ya da “azgelişmiş” dediğimiz toplumlar düşünüldüğünde, bariz bir olguyu gözardı ediyoruz: Bu toplumlar, bizim dolaylı ya da doğrudan yollardan sebep olduğumuz sarsıntı ve çalkantılardan sağ çıkabilmiş, kolu kanadı kırık kalıntılardan başka bir şey değildir. Zira Batı dünyasının gelişmesine imkân veren şey, XVI-XIX. yüzyıllar arasında egzotik diyarların ve buralarda yaşayan halkların sömürülmesi olmuştur. Azgelişmiş denen toplumlar ile sanayi uygarlığı arasındaki yabancılık ilişkisi öncelikle şu noktaya dayanır: Sanayi uygarlığı, söz konusu toplumlarda kendi eserini görür... – ama bir türlü kabul edemediği olumsuz bir kılıkta.”

**
“Sanayi sosyolojisi uzmanları, işlerin parsellenmesini ve basitleşmesini, çalışma inisiyatifinin yitimini, üreticinin ürettiği şeyden uzaklaşmasını dayatan nesnel üretim ile, çalışana kendi kişiliğini ve yaratma arzusunu ifade etme imkânı veren öznel üretim arasındaki çelişkiyi ortaya seriyorlar. Tek bir örnek verecek olursam; bir Melanezyalı toplumsal kurallar yüzünden kızkardeşinin ev işleriyle ilgilenmeye mecbur olduğunda ya da bahçesinde yetiştirdiği tatlı patateslerin boyu uğruna tarım tanrılarıyla iyi geçindiğini kanıtlamaya çalıştığında, teknik, kültürel, toplumsal, dinsel kaygıların hepsiyle birden hareket ediyordur.

İktisatçı –olur a– unuttuğunda antropoloğun hatırlattığı şudur: İnsan sürekli daha fazla üretmeye teşvik edilemez. Çalışırken, aynı zamanda doğasının derinlerine kök salmış birtakım arzuları tatmin etmeye de uğraşır: Birey olarak kendini gerçekleştirmeye, nesnelere damgasını vurmaya, çalışmaları aracılığıyla öznelliğine bir nesnellik kazandırmaya gayret eder.

İlkel denen toplumlar işte bu bakımlardan bize örnek olabilirler. Bu toplumlar, üretilen zenginlikleri ahlaki ve toplumsal değerlere dönüştürmeyi amaçlayan ilkeleri temel alırlar: Bir işte şahsen başarı elde etmek, akrabalara ve komşulara saygı göstermek, ahlaki ve toplumsal açıdan itibar kazanmak, insan ile doğa ve doğaüstü dünya arasında uyum kurmak. Antropolojik araştırmalar, insan doğasının bu farklı unsurları arasında uyum kurulması gerekliliğini daha iyi anlamamıza yardımcı olur. Ayrıca sanayi uygarlığının bu uyumu yok etmeye yöneldiği her yerde, antropoloji bizleri uyarabilir ve uyumu tekrar kazanmak için izlenecek yolları gösterebilir.”

**
“Bu toplumların gelişmeye ve sanayileşmeye gösterdiği direncin sebeplerini açıklamak için, içlerinden bir kısmının rekabetten uzak olduğuna gönderme yapılmıştır. Gelgelelim şunu unutmamalıyız ki bu toplumlarda eleştirdiğimiz pasiflik ve kayıtsızlık, en baştan beri mevcut olan bir durum değil, temasın akabinde ortaya çıkan travmanın sonucudur. Ayrıca bize bir kusur ve noksan gibi gelen birtakım şeyler, insanlar ile dünya arasındaki bağlara dair özgün bir tasavvurun ürünü olabilir pekâlâ. Bir örnekle açıklayayım: Yeni Gine’nin iç kısımlarında yaşayan halklar misyonerlerin futbol oynadığını görüp, bu oyunu büyük bir hevesle benimsemişlerdi. Ama iki takımdan birinin galibiyeti yerine iki takımın da galibiyet ve mağlubiyet sayısı eşit oluncaya kadar maç yapmaya devam ediyorlardı. Oyun bizdeki gibi, bir taraf galip gelince değil, iki tarafın da mağlup olmadığı kesinleşince sona eriyordu.”

Antropolojinin Yararları

Hümanist düşünce, üç yüzyıl boyunca, Batı insanının düşüncesini ve eylemlerini besleyecek ve esinleyecekti. Bugün şunu görüyoruz ki bu düşünce, dünya savaşları gibi küresel katliamları, meskûn dünyanın büyük kısmında devamlı hüküm süren sefaleti ve açlığı, hava ve su kirliliğini, doğal kaynak ve güzelliklerin talan edilmesini vb. önlemeye muktedir olamayacaktı.
**
... antropolojinin yararlarından biri –belki de asıl yararı– bizlere, yani zengin ve güçlü uygarlıkların mensuplarına, belli bir mütevazılık esinlemesi ve bilgelik öğretmesidir.

Antropologlar, yaşam biçimlerimizin, inandığımız değerlerin, mümkün olan yegâne yaşam biçimleri ve değerler olmadığını; başka yaşam tarzlarının, başka değer sistemlerinin de insan topluluklarının mutluluğa ulaşmasına imkân vermiş olduğunu ve hâlâ da vermeye devam ettiğini kanıtlamaya çalışırlar. Dolayısıyla antropoloji, böbürlenmelerimize gem vurmaya, başka yaşam tarzlarına saygı duymaya, bizi şaşırtan, şoke eden ya da tiksindiren başka usulleri öğrenmek suretiyle kendimizi sorgulamaya çağırır bizleri...

**
“İlkel diye adlandırılan toplumlar ile bizim yaşadığımız toplumlar arasında yukarıda yapmış olduğum kaba karşılaştırma, bizim toplumlarımızın kullandığı şekliyle Tarih’in nesnel gerçeklerden ziyade önyargıları ve arzuları ifade ettiğini anlamaya yöneltmiştir bizi. Bu durumda da antropoloji eleştirel düşünce konusunda bize bir ders verir. Hem kendi toplumlarımızın hem de farklı toplumların geçmişinin bir tek anlamı olmadığını daha iyi idrak etmemizi sağlar. Geçmişe dair mutlak bir yorum yoktur, tamamen göreli olan farklı farklı yorumlar vardır.”