Muslim
jurists since the 9th century have referred to the Islamic world as being a
‘house’ or ‘abode’ of Islam (dar al-islam). Though the sources do not extend
the metaphor, I am tempted to do so. Accordingly, the land on which the house
was built was first ‘acquired’ by Arabs, who also provided the house’s
architectural plans and foundations. Most of the house’s bricks and builders were
Persian, and for much of Islamic history, from the 9th to the 19th centuries,
its landlords were Turks (who also contributed to
the menu and welcome-mat). Shiites, for their part, have long believed that the
house was built on shaky foundations, and nowadays the building has been
divided into individual apartments of varying sizes. Since the 18th century,
the interior design has been dominated by Western styles which, in some flats,
clashed with the traditional décor, creating spots of ugliness. Islamists might
say that the apartments are little more than seedy motel rooms in need of
urgent attention, for which they hope to raze the whole building and rebuild it
as a house. What this extended metaphor attempts to demonstrate is how the
various peoples of Islamic history have interacted and combined to build something
in which they all have a signifi cant stake and to which they all contributed,
albeit in different ways.
Tuesday, April 26, 2016
Mosques and Diversity of Islam
Not
only is the mosque a symbol of Islam’s diversity, it also typifies how
‘organic’ Islamic culture is. Mosques in China look Chinese rather than
Arabian, Syrian, Iraqi, or Greco-Roman. Mughal-era
and Ottoman-era mosques are easily distinguishable, although both are, at least
superfi cially, the products of the same. The ziggurat of Agar Quf (Dur Kuigalzu,
Iraq). This ziggurat was built by the Kassites (r. 1531–1155 BCE) and was
partially restored by the Iraqi government in the 1970s Turco-Islamic culture.
In fact, Mughal mosques mix Islamic and Indian elements, while Ottoman mosques
mix Islamic and Byzantine ones. Even when mosque-building was a way of
asserting Islam’s victory over other religions, Islam and its monuments were
defi ned in direct relation to those of local religious traditions. Whereas the
Romans were bullish in stamping out
other cultures’ architectural traditions, Muslims have always been conscious of
local contexts and have integrated features of earlier societies into their
own, often creating a unique blend between
old and new styles. In a way, Islam is the fi rst ‘green’ civilization (though,
it should be admitted, inadvertently so), with a long history of recycling
older materials and using, for the most part,
only local products and traditions.
The Turks
The Turks’ involvement with Islamic history is full of surprises, almost all of which are pleasant. The first surprise is that they ever came to be involved at all. In their pre-Islamic history, Turks had created a series of empires (c. 552–840, and in western regions of the Eurasian Steppe into the 10th century) and adopted a number of religions along the way, including Manichaeism, Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, and Judaism, as well as retaining the traditional forms of shamanism. Moreover, unlike the Arabs and Persians, the Turks were not native to the Near East, their original homeland being in Mongolia. As nomads of the Eurasian Steppe, they lingered on the edge of settled civilizations, plying the routes from east to west and occasionally creating states of their own. The empire of the Uyghur Turks (744–840), for instance, had close relations with the Chinese, exchanging horses for silk (at rates favourable to the Turks), and entering into occasional marriage alliances with the Chinese ruling families. As the Huns in earlier centuries and the Mongols in later ones, their ultimate target was Chinese civilization; had they been given a choice in the matter, the Turks probably would have joined the sedentary world in China rather than the Near East. Thus, when they first entered the Islamic world it was against their will, as military slaves in the 820s.
**
For over a
millennium, most Muslims lived under the rule or protection of Turks. It is not
surprising, then, that Turkish terminology and administrative practices have
left their stamp on Islamic history, particularly in the classical and early
modern periods. In fact, the word for ‘stamp’ in modern Arabic, damgha, is an
ancient Turkish word (originally pronounced ‘tamgha’), having meant ‘tribal
brand’ in pre-Islamic times and ‘commercial tax’ in the Mongol period. The
fortuitous journey of this word, from ancient Mongolia to the modern Arab
world, neatly illustrates the scope and range of the Turks’ activity in
history.
**
The Turks
often chose to spread and develop Persian rather than Turkish literature. They
did produce their own literary works: the earliest Turkish documents date from
the 8th century and by the 11th century, Islamo-Turkish works were being
composed, two of which – a mirror for princes from 1068 and an Arabic- Turkish
lexicon from 1077 – are widely known. Despite this, the Turks relied on
Persians in all things literary, a fact that is captured in a proverb recorded
in the 11th-century lexicon, according to which, ‘There is no Turk without an
Iranian, just as there is no hat without a head’. Beginning in the 14th century,
and increasing in the following one, literature in both western (Ottoman) and
eastern (Chaghatay) Turkish came to be composed at Turkish courts. Hence,
Babur’s memoirs were composed in Chaghatay, though the high culture at the
Mughal court was Persian. Still, it is ironic that one of the founders of
Turkish literary culture, ‘Ali Shir Nava’i (d. 1501), wrote a polemical work on
the superiority of Turkish over Persian, the vocabulary of which is nearly
two-thirds Persian.
**
The ‘crescent
and star’ symbol with which Islam is often associated is of ancient Turkish
(rather than Arab or Persian) provenance, and also that Turks have literally
nourished Islamic (and other) civilizations through their culinary influence. Yoghurt,
stuffed vine-leaves (dolma), kebabs, shawarma, and baklava, amongst many other
well-known foods, all originate with the Turks (though Turkish coffee does
not). And if the story is true that the croissant was created by Viennese
bakers in celebration of the failed Ottoman siege of their city in 1683, then –
at least indirectly – we owe them croissants too.
**
A final surprise
is that a people such as the Turks who have long been associated with military
prowess have always been remarkably tolerant of, and open to, other cultures
and religions. Perhaps because of their travels along the Eurasian Steppe
Route, Turks have been exposed to numerous unrelated cultures in a way that some
other nomads were not. (By contrast, during their own seasonal migrations, the
Arabs came into contact with peoples to their north, south, and east – to their
west was the Red Sea – who were basically sedentary versions of themselves.)
For this reason, the Turks have a long history of willingly incorporating
elements of other cultures into their own, as demonstrated by their adoption of
others’ letters – not only in the figurative sense of the word, with Persian
high culture, but also literally, going through various alphabets until they
accepted the Arabic script, like other Muslim peoples. Signifi cantly, their
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances has led them, unlike the Arabs or
Persians, to adopt a Latin alphabet in the 20th century, a change undertaken not
only by Turks in Turkey, but also those in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and
Azerbaijan. In a sense, the Turks have shown themselves to be both experts at
identifying winning trends and flexible enough to align their own societies
with them. This may be seen in their adoption of Islam, of Persian as a
literary language, of gunpowder (against the grain of their indigenous traditions),
and of modernity. Arabs and Persians may protest that they are too proud of
their traditions to abandon them under pressure from
outsiders, but the Turks can retort that in adopting and adapting to the
prevailing culture – in this case, modernity – they too are remaining true to
their traditions.
The Persians
The Arabs and, as we will see, Turks owe their prominence on the world stage to Islam. The Persians do not. Persians have a proud and long history of statehood that dates back to the Achaemenid period (559–330 BCE); when Arab conquerors defeated the Sasanid empire (224–651), they were putting an end to some 12 centuries of almost uninterrupted Persian self-rule and political autonomy. Thus, whereas the rise of Islam was an unmitigated success for the Arabs and Turks, it was something of a mixed blessing for the Persians, who gained monotheism and the True Religion, but lost their empire and independence. And although the early Muslims created their state in formerly Byzantine and Sasanid lands, the Sasanids paid the higher price of the two: conquered Byzantine subjects could fl ee to parts of the empire that had not been conquered and any Christian, Greek culture that had been uprooted by the conquests could be replanted in surviving Byzantine lands. The whole of the Sasanid empire, however, was conquered by Muslims, and although some Zoroastrians did flee to India (where they have been known as ‘Parsees’ ever since), Persian culture had nowhere to go but underground. All of this had shortterm, medium-term, and long-term consequences.
In the short
term, the Persian people (and landscape) resisted the Arab armies fi ercely,
which meant that in some provinces caliphal rule, conversion to Islam, Arab
settlement, and Arabization were superficial. In most regions, Persian notables
were allowed to retain a measure of power and Persian administrative traditions
endured accordingly. Curiously, many Persians viewed the Muslim conquests as a
temporary, reversible blip, and for the next two centuries an array of
‘redeemers’ appeared with the declared aim of restoring the
pre-Islamic political, social, and religious status quo. Some modern historians
and even some observers at the time have (wrongly) viewed various events in
Islamic history as examples of Persian-redemption movements, including the
Abbasid Revolution, the creation of Baghdad, the rise of the Buyids, Samanids, and
Safavids, and the adoption by the Safavid rulers and their subjects of Shiism.
Such an interpretation of events is incorrect in each case, but it is accurate
in its general awareness of the traumatic impact that the rise of Islam had on
many Persians.
In the medium
term, rather than attempting to reverse the effects of Islam’s arrival,
Persians and Persian culture were Islamicized. This happened most obviously
under the Abbasids who, by moving to Iraq, constructed their power-base from
the rubble of Sasanid institutions. Not only was political and governmental organization
inherited from Persian traditions (as Byzantine ones had been inherited by the Umayyads
in Syria), but much of Abbasid civilization – including literature, history,
theology, religious sciences, Quranic studies, and even Arabic poetry and linguistics
– was created and dominated by people who composed books in Arabic but told
bedtime stories in Persian. Persians were very much aware of their cultural
dominance and a literary movement arose promoting Persian culture and reminding
the Arabs of their indebtedness to it. Even the great Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406),
writing in the far west of the Islamic world, included in his Muqaddima (on
which, see below p. 105) a section entitled ‘Most of the scholars of Islam have
been Persians (‘ajam)’.
In the long
term, Islamic culture itself was Persianized, even in the face of viable
alternatives. This process began with the rise of semi-independent Persian
dynasties in the Abbasid east, where rulers adopted Sasanid titles, traced for
their dynasties Sasanid genealogies, and, most importantly, patronized
literature in the Persian language. Perhaps the most famous literary work in
Persian, the Shahnama (‘Book of Kings’), was composed in Samanid times and
dedicated to a Ghaznavid ruler. It recounts in epic form all of Iranian history
that is thought to have really mattered, beginning with the creation of the
world and, tellingly, ending
abruptly with the Muslim defeat of the Sasanid forces at the Battle of al-Qadisiyya
(637).
Above all, the
spread of Turks, Mongols, and Turco-Mongols to and within Islamic lands led to
an effl orescence of Persian literature, even – or especially – outside of
Iran. Persian-speaking missionaries played a
pivotal role in the spread of Islam to the east, and it is no coincidence that
the religious terminology used by Chinese Muslims prefers Persian words such as
namaz (‘prayer’) over Arabic synonyms (in this case, salat). Before entering
the Islamic world in the late 10th century, the Turkish tribes from whom the Saljuqs and
Ottomans are descended were converted to Islam by Persians; religion was thus
filtered to them through a Persian sieve. When the Saljuqs created a dynasty
in Iran/Iraq, its administrative and literary forms were Persian, and when
their relatives moved westwards to conquer Anatolia and create the Ottoman
empire, here too Persian was adopted as the language of culture.
The Mongol and
Timurid conquests, destructive though they were, also contributed to the
success of the Persian language: on the one hand, having no attachment to
Arabic as a religious language, the Mongols in Iran (who employed local,
Iranian administrators) patronized Persian scholarship even in those fields that
hitherto had been reserved for Arabic. On the other hand, the havoc wrought by
the conquests forced leading Iranian scholars to seek safety (and patronage)
elsewhere, mostly in Muslim India.
Under the Delhi and, especially, the Mughal sultans Indo-Islamic literature,
the arts (painting, in particular), and imperial administration were Persian in
language and form, and some of the fi nest specimens of Persian culture were
produced in Mughal lands. Thus, from the 11th to 19th centuries (even later, in some
regions) Persian was the leading language of high culture throughout the
Islamic world. Even when it was eventually eclipsed, by English and then Urdu
and Hindi in India, and by Turkish and Arabic in the post-Ottoman provinces,
its impact was still felt on many levels: Urdu literature still follows Persian models, while
trendy Westerners read the mystical writings of Rumi (d. 1273), about whom it
was said, ‘He has brought a [Holy] Book, though he is not a prophet’. Persian
literature also found fans in Goethe (West-Eastern Divan) and Puccini (Turandot),
amongst numerous other Western authors.
Arabs
Interestingly,
from the vantage point of very early Islamic history, the conflation is not
entirely unreasonable. It could be argued that Islam began as a chosen-people
religion aimed exclusively at the Arabs; the
Quran (12: 2, and 43: 3) states that it is in the Arabic language ‘so that you
may understand [its message]’, a statement that assumes its audience to be
Arabic-speakers. Moreover, under the Umayyad caliphs, the conversion of
non-Arabs to Islam was normally discouraged and those who did convert were made
‘clients’ of Arab tribes. In other words, to be a Muslim one had to be an Arab
– or at least an honorary one. And for centuries, Jews in Muslim lands (usually
in Persia) argued that Muhammad was indeed a true Prophet sent by God to spread
monotheism, but only amongst the pagan Arabs who needed it. (Persian Jews no longer
subscribe to this theory.) Support for such an idea comes from the Quran itself
(46: 12), which states: ‘And before this, was the Book of Moses as a guide and
a mercy: And this Book confirms (it) in the Arabic tongue . . .’
Clearly,
however, that is not the only way of looking at things and is certainly not how
things turned out. Still, the Arabs and their culture have been central to all
Muslims in a number of ways. The early association of Islam with Arabs,
together with the long-standing objection (now obsolete) to translating the Quran, have
meant that even non-Arab Muslims have had reason to learn at least the basics
of Arabic. And it does no harm that Arabic is regarded – even amongst Persians
– as the language of God (though most Muslim historians hold that Adam and Eve spoke
Aramaic). Crucially, those who want to read the seminal works of
Islamic law, theology, Quranic studies, hadith, history, and so forth must have
a thorough grounding in Arabic. As Islam spread for the most part in regions
and periods where literacy was very limited, a Muslim’s first experience of
literacy often involved learning to read and write God’s language.
Consequently,
even non-Arabic languages came to be written in a version of the Arabic script
modifi ed to accommodate the particularities of the spoken languages. Persian,
Urdu (Hindi in Arabic script), and – until relatively recently – Turkish, as well
as a host of other languages, use the Arabic alphabet and contain
numerous Arabic words. For these reasons, in the first few centuries of Islamic
history all authors regardless of ethnicity would compose their works in
Arabic. Arabic might thus be compared with Chinese, the stability of which over
millennia allowed Chinese scholars to read about and build on their
predecessors’ ideas, with the result that many world-changing inventions originated
there – from paper, printing, the compass, and gunpowder, to magic tricks and
kung-fu. As a scholarly language shared by non-native speakers, Arabic also brings
to mind the use of Latin in pre- and early-modern Europe.
The spread of
Arabic as a scholarly language allowed scholars, Muslim and non-Muslim alike,
to communicate their ideas across boundaries and generations, with truly
impressive results in many fields. In the 9th century, for instance, a
considerable portion of the ancient Greek writings was translated into Arabic under caliphal
auspices, at a time when most in the West had lost the ability to enjoy this
heritage, and it is through translations into Latin of these Arabic versions of
Greek texts that Europe rediscovered many of these works and their ideas. Thus,
it has been argued (if not widely accepted) that the Renaissance as we know it
would not have happened had the Arabs and their language remained in Arabia.
Shiism in Iran
Around the
time that Osman was creating his state in Anatolia, a native of Azerbaijan
named Safi al-Din (1252–1334) founded a Sufi brotherhood in Ardabil, whose
followers came to be known as Safavids. By the late 15th century, this
brotherhood had morphed into a militant Shiite–Sufi movement that held its
leader to be either the
hidden Imam or God Himself. At the turn of the 16th century, the leader of the
Safavid order, a teenager named Isma‘il, came out of hiding and set about
conquering Iran; by 1501, he was the region’s shah with a capital at Tabriz. In
1514, however, the Safavid forces were defeated by the Ottomans at Chaldiran,
with three signifi cant consequences: first, the modern Turkish–Iranian border
was set; second, having lost the battle (and their claim to divinity) to
Ottoman gunpowder, the Safavid shahs acquired gunpowder too; and third, with
Ottoman forces encroaching on their western provinces, subsequent shahs moved the
capital eastwards, eventually settling on Isfahan under ‘Abbas I (r.
1587–1629).
In moving
eastwards, the Safavids were distancing themselves from their original Turkmen
power-base, and digging their heels into Iran’s heartland. The religious
character of the state was purged of its radical ideas, which were replaced
with orthodox, Twelver Shiism (while Turkish elites were replaced with Persian ones). This
form of Shiism was forcibly imposed on a largely Sunni population, and Shiite
scholars from Bahrain, Greater Syria, and Iraq were imported to Isfahan, where
both religious and secular culture flourished. To his capital in Isfahan, ‘Abbas
also shifted populations from provincial towns to create a cultural and
economic hub. It was thus under the Safavids that Iran’s modern borders and religious
and cultural identities were brought into clear focus – in sharp contrast to
the tolerant heterogeneity of the Ottoman empire. Persian literature reached new
heights and, to the extent that both the Ottomans and Mughals (or
‘Moghuls’, Persian for ‘Mongols’) had adopted Persian as the language of high
culture (in pre-Ottoman Anatolia and pre-Mughal India), the Safavids were at
the very centre of Islamic civilization. After the death of ‘Abbas II (r. 1642–66),
however, decline set in: natural disasters (famines, earthquakes, and the spread
of diseases) combined with ineffectual rulers to leave a political vacuum that
was filled by Shiite ‘ulama’, or ‘mullahs’, who tightened Shiism’s hold on
society. Imposing one’s religion by force is no way to win friends and influence people, and embittered Sunni tribesmen from Afghanistan overran the
Safavids in
1722, putting an end to their rule. Political unity – and Shiism – returned to
Iran with the Qajars (1794–1925), who ushered Iran into modernity.
Sunday, April 24, 2016
1100-1500
The first two
periods are often referred to as the ‘formative’ and ‘classical’ periods of
Islamic history; and for most Muslims (who, it should be noted, tend not to use
these terms or chronological divisions), they are the centuries that count the
most. But the overwhelming
majority of the world’s Muslims would almost certainly still be infidels were it not for the
events of the 1100–1500 period.
And although modern
Islamists (those for whom Islam is a political as well as a religious
system) shine their
spotlight on the age of the Prophet and Rashidun caliphs, it is in response to the
events of this period that Islamist movements emerged. From a European
perspective, this is the period without which Turkey would have no case for
inclusion into the EU (and no case for being ‘Turkey’ at all), and without
which Russia would have no ‘issues’ with Muslims to their south.
Golden Age: 800-1100
That Islam
exists at all is due to events in the 600–800 period. That it looks the way it
does now is largely due to events in the 800–1100 one. And just as camels
represented the first period, caravans can be said to represent the second one.
A caravan consists of many camels (or other pack animals) led together by a group of
travellers, which reflects one of the major differences between the Umayyads
and the early Abbasids: the former created a somewhat exclusive, ‘Arab’ empire
whereas the latter were consciously cosmopolitan and inclusive, empowering non-
Arabs (mainly those who were culturally Persian – appropriately, ‘caravan’ is a
Persian word) and absorbing them into Islam. Caravans are also central to this
period for plying the routes that linked the Abbasids’ sprawling provinces,
transporting pilgrims, envoys, merchants, scholars, and soldiers across a road
network that encouraged a level of internationalism, multiculturalism, and
inter-connectivity that most Westerners would associate with modernity.
The
foundations of this achievement are strikingly similar to those that are
credited with the emergence of the modern West. But instead of a printing
revolution, the Islamic world in this period experienced a paper revolution,
whereby more expensive and elitist methods of writing (on papyrus and
parchment, for example)
were replaced by this more affordable medium. Literacy is thought to have
increased dramatically, creating new readerships that consumed (and, in a
circular way, generated) new genres of literature. Everything from pre-Islamic
poetry to works on theology, philosophy, medicine, science, belles-lettres, and
history was recorded in written form. A commensurate eruption in Islamic
culture and civilization resulted, producing a diverse civilian elite in the
Islamic world by the 9th century.
Travel and
trade also flourished in this period, feeding from and into this cultural efflorescence.
It is not just that travelogues (both real and imagined), maps, and geographies
were produced on the basis of new experiences in far-flung lands – though this
certainly happened – but also that Near Eastern merchants expanded their remit
and horizons well beyond Abbasid borders. One 9th-century writer tells us of
polyglot Iraqi Jews who criss-crossed Eurasia, travelling between France and
China (covering Muslim lands, southern Russia, and India along the way), and
the discovery of thousands of Abbasid coins in Scandinavia attests to the scope
of this commercial activity. Even the spread of papermaking from China to the
Near East is instructive in this context: our sources tell us that Muslims
defeated a Chinese army in 751, capturing papermakers in the process from whom
they learned the techniques themselves. What is interesting is that such
hostile circumstances – a bloody battle in Central Asia – did little to hinder
cross-cultural interaction and the spread of commodities, people, and ideas.
Muslims in this period had active frontiers in Spain, southern Europe, Central
Asia, India, and Africa, affording both rulers and individuals the opportunity
to derive kudos from waging jihad. The story about Chinese papermakers (and it
is almost certainly just a story) reminds us that such confrontations were seen
by the story’s authors to present further occasions for cultural
interaction as much as they stifled it.
Camels
What camels
have going for them is their incredible ability to cope with short supplies
over long periods; they are thus economically efficient and low-maintenance.
What they have going against them is that their sensitive feet cannot cope with
cold or uneven terrain. Muhammad may have gone to the mountain, but his immediate
successors did no such thing, at least not to begin with, and throughout
Islamic history mountain ranges have proven – by chance or by design – to be
safe havens for those seeking to withstand pressure to convert, conform, or
cooperate more generally. On account of their relative inaccessibility,
mountains have helped locals as well as newcomers seeking refuge to retain
their religious traditions (Christians in northern Spain,
Anatolia, Armenia, Lebanon, and the Ethiopian highlands; and Zoroastrians and
other dualists in northern Iran), and their cultural traditions (Persian in
Iran, Berber in North Africa, Kurdish in northern Iraq), just as they were
exploited by those escaping the reach of the central authorities more generally
(Ismailis in Syria and northern Iran, Zaydis in Yemen, and the Taliban in
Afghanistan). It is not for nothing that Moroccan political authorities
referred to their mountainous regions as ‘siba’, [the lands of] rebellion.
Soviet and latterly American troops in Afghanistan learned these facts the hard
way; local Muslims have
known them all
along.
Islamic History: A Very Short Introduction
Muhammad died
in 632, having been the religious and political ruler of the Muslim state since
it was created in 622, and clearly someone else had to take charge of affairs
in his absence. But who would this be, and how would he be chosen? One solution
proposed was that the communal elders should get together and choose the
most suitable candidate from amongst Muhammad’s tribe (Quraysh). This is what
Sunnis think, and such a consultation (shura) is the basis on which some of the
earliest caliphs were selected. But what if Muhammad himself, with God’s
inspiration, had actually nominated a suitable successor in his lifetime?
Shiites believe that this is what happened and that ‘Ali was chosen; according
to them the office passes through ‘Ali’s direct descendants from one generation
to the next. As seen in Chapter 1, Shiites could not
always agree on the precise line of the imam’s descent, which created further
schisms. What if ‘Ali turned out to be a disappointing leader, as those who
would become the Kharijites thought? For them, the caliph should simply be the
most suitable candidate for the job, regardless of lineage (and when ‘Ali
turned out not to be the one, they killed him). Others thought that a leader’s
ability to take control of the state should be the decisive factor. After all,
if God is guiding events, and He brings power into the hands of a
particular person or family, who can argue? This was the Umayyad point of view.
The list can be greatly extended, but the point should be clear: not only did
the caliphate fail to unite the umma, it was the chief cause of divisions
within it. And instead of unleashing the umma’s collective power, Muslims
throughout the course of Islamic history have expended much of their
intellectual and physical energies fi ghting amongst themselves about it.
Saturday, April 23, 2016
Positive Self-Evaluation
The psychological
literature is full of studies illustrating the benefits—both personal and
social—of holding positive “illusions” about ourselves. Researchers find that
when they induce a positive mood, by whatever means, people are more likely to
interact with others and more likely to help others. Those feeling good about
themselves are more cooperative in bargaining situations and more likely to
find a constructive solution to their conflicts. They are also better problem
solvers, more motivated to succeed, and more likely to persist in the face of a
challenge. Motivated reasoning enables our minds to defend us against
unhappiness, and in the process it gives us the strength to overcome the many
obstacles in life that might otherwise overwhelm us. The more of it we do, the
better off we tend to be, for it seems to inspire us to strive to become what
we think we are. In fact, studies show that the people with the most accurate
self-perceptions tend to be moderately depressed, suffer from low self-esteem,
or both. An overly positive self-evaluation, on the other hand, is normal and
healthy.
Motivated Reasoning
As it turns out,
the brain is a decent scientist but an absolutely outstanding lawyer. The
result is that in the struggle to fashion a coherent, convincing view of
ourselves and the rest of the world, it is the impassioned advocate that
usually wins over the truth seeker. We’ve seen in earlier chapters how the
unconscious mind is a master at using limited data to construct a version of
the world that appears realistic and complete to its partner, the conscious
mind. Visual perception, memory, and even emotion are all constructs, made of a
mix of raw, incomplete, and sometimes conflicting data. We use the same kind of
creative process to generate our self-image. When we paint our picture of self,
our attorney-like unconscious blends fact and illusion, exaggerating our
strengths, minimizing our weaknesses, creating a virtually Picassoesque series
of distortions in which some parts have been blown up to enormous size (the
parts we like) and others shrunk to near invisibility. The rational scientists
of our conscious minds then innocently admire the self-portrait, believing it
to be a work of photographic accuracy.
Psychologists
call the approach taken by our inner advocate “motivated reasoning.” Motivated
reasoning helps us to believe in our own goodness and competence, to feel in
control, and to generally see ourselves in an overly positive light. It also
shapes the way we understand and interpret our environment, especially our
social environment, and it helps us justify our preferred beliefs. Still, it
isn’t possible for 40 percent to squeeze into the top 5 percent, for 60 percent
to squeeze into the top decile, or for 94 percent to be in the top half, so
convincing ourselves of our great worth is not always an easy task.
Fortunately, in accomplishing it, our minds have a great ally, an aspect of
life whose importance we’ve encountered before: ambiguity. Ambiguity creates
wiggle room in what may otherwise be inarguable truth, and our unconscious
minds employ that wiggle room to build a narrative of ourselves, of others, and
of our environment that makes the best of our fate, that fuels us in the good
times, and gives us comfort in the bad.
Sorting People and Things
If you read
someone a list of ten or twenty items that could be bought at a supermarket,
that person will remember only a few. If you recite the list repeatedly, the
person’s recall will improve. But what really helps is if the items are
mentioned within the categories they fall into—for example, vegetables, fruits,
and cereals. Research suggests that we have neurons in our prefrontal cortex
that respond to categories, and the list exercise illustrates the reason:
categorization is a strategy our brains use to more efficiently process
information.
**
Every object and
person we encounter in the world is unique, but we wouldn’t function very well
if we perceived them that way. We don’t have the time or the mental bandwidth
to observe and consider each detail of every item in our environment. Instead,
we employ a few salient traits that we do observe to assign the object to a
category, and then we base our assessment of the object on the category rather
than the object itself. By maintaining a set of categories, we thus expedite
our reactions. If we hadn’t evolved to operate that way, if our brains treated
everything we encountered as an individual, we might be eaten by a bear while
still deciding whether this particular furry creature is as dangerous as the
one that ate Uncle Bob. Instead, once we see a couple bears eat our relatives
the whole species gets a bad reputation. Then, thanks to categorical thinking,
when we spot a huge, shaggy animal with large, sharp incisors, we don’t hang
around gathering more data; we act on our automatic hunch that it is dangerous
and move away from it.
**
Thinking in terms
of generic categories helps us to navigate our environment with great speed and
efficiency; we understand an object’s gross significance first and worry about
its individuality later. Categorization is one of the most important mental
acts we perform, and we do it all the time.
**
But the arrow of
our reasoning can also point the other way. If we conclude that a certain set
of objects belongs to one group and a second set of objects to another, we may
then perceive those within the same group as more similar than they really
are—and those in different groups as less similar than they really are. Merely
placing objects in groups can affect our judgment of those objects. So while
categorization is a natural and crucial shortcut, like our brain’s other
survival-oriented tricks, it has its drawbacks.
**
In another study,
researchers found that if you ask people in a given city to estimate the
difference in temperature between June 1 and June 30, they will tend to
underestimate it; but if you ask them to estimate the difference in temperature
between June 15 and July 15, they will overestimate it.4 The artificial
grouping of days into months skews our perception: we see two days within a
month as being more similar to each other than equally distant days that occur
in two different months, even though the time interval between them is
identical.
In all these
examples, when we categorize, we polarize. Things that for one arbitrary reason
or another are identified as belonging to the same category seem more similar
to each other than they really are, while those in different categories seem
more different than they really are. The unconscious mind transforms fuzzy
differences and subtle nuances into clear-cut distinctions. Its goal is to
erase irrelevant detail while maintaining information on what is important.
When that’s done successfully, we simplify our environment and make it easier
and faster to navigate. When it’s done inappropriately, we distort our
perceptions, sometimes with results harmful to others, and even ourselves.
That’s especially true when our tendency to categorize affects our view of
other humans—when we view the doctors in a given practice, the attorneys in a
given law firm, the fans of a certain sports team, or the people in a given
race or ethnic group as more alike than they really are.
**
Remember that the
propensity to categorize, even to categorize people, is for the most part a
blessing. It allows us to understand the difference between a bus driver and a
bus passenger, a store clerk and a customer, a receptionist and a physician, a
maître d’ and a waiter, and all the other strangers we interact with,
without our having to pause and consciously puzzle out everyone’s role anew
during each encounter. The challenge is not how to stop categorizing but how to
become aware of when we do it in ways that prevent us from being able to see
individual people for who they really are.
Margaret Thatcher
If voice makes
such a huge impression, the key question becomes, To what extent can someone
consciously alter their voice? Consider the case of Margaret Hilda Roberts, who
in 1959 was elected as a Conservative member of British Parliament for North
London. She had higher ambitions, but to those in her inner circle, her voice
was an issue.16 “She had a schoolmarmish, very slightly bossy, slightly
hectoring voice,” recalled Tim Bell, the mastermind of her party’s publicity
campaigns. Her own publicity adviser, Gordon Reese, was more graphic. Her high
notes, he said, were “dangerous to passing sparrows.” Proving that though her
politics were fixed, her voice was pliable, Margaret Hilda Roberts took her
confidants’ advice, lowered the pitch, and increased her social dominance.
There is no way to measure exactly how much difference the change made, but she
did pretty well for herself. After the Conservatives were defeated in 1974,
Margaret Thatcher—she had married the wealthy businessman Denis Thatcher in
1951—became the party’s leader and, eventually, prime minister.
İkiyüzlülük
Müslümanların bilim sahasında tarih boyunca yaptığı katkılardan bahseden kitaplara bakma şansınız olmuştur.
Al-Farabi, Biruni, İbn Sina, Nasreddin Tusi, Şemseddin Semarkandi, İbn Miskeveyh, Ömer Hayyam, Ibn Heysem, vb.
Genel olarak burada zikredilen şahısların çalışmalarından gurur duyarız. Astronomiden optik oradan fizik ve matematiğe çok geniş bir sahada çok önemli katkılarda bulunmuşlardır çünkü. Dindarların en muhafazakarından en liberaline kadar ortak tepkisi umumiyetle budur. Hali hazırda içinde yaşadığımız karanlık günlerde parlayan ve İslamın aydınlık bir medeniyetin gerçekleştiricisi olduğunu hatırlatan deniz feneri gibi insanlardır bunlar.
Ama bir problem var burada. Bir çelişki. Daha ziyade bir ikiyüzlülük. Yüzleşmemiz gereken ve bu gün neden bu halde olduğumuzu açıklayan bir ikiyüzlülük.
Başarıları ile övündüğümüz bu şahısların pek çoğu bugün mezarlarından kalksalar ve Suudi Arabistan ya da Pakistan gibi bir Müslüman ülkesine gitseler yazdıkları kitaplarından dolayı irtidad (apostasy) yasalarından dolayı yargılanır ve idam da dahil olmak üzere çok ağır cezalara çarptırılırlardı.
Mesela bir Nasreddin Tusi’yi bulsalar trigonometri alanında yazdığı Kitab el-Şekl eserini önemsemez ve görmezden gelir, onu Tecrid al-İtiqad adlı eserinden dolayı hapse ya da idama mahkum ederlerdi.
Biruni‘yi muhtemelen Kanun al-Mesudi adlı astronomi, coğrafya, dinamik, mühendislik, ve matematik üzerine yazdığı eserinden dolayı ödüllendirmek yerine Tahkik ma al-Hind adlı karşılaştırmalı din çalışmaları üzerine yazdığı eserinden dolayı ya tekfir ya da izole edebilirlerdi. Böyle bir eseri bugün Ezher gibi bir üniversitede savunamaz, bastıramaz, ve işinden olurdu.
İbn Sina‘nın tıb üzerine yazdığı şaheser Şifa’sını görmez, onu metafiziğinden dolayı küfür ya da ilhad ile itham ederlerdi…
Örnekleri artırabilirim.
Burada şu soruyu samimiyetle sormak gerekiyor. Bu şahıslar dinen makbul insanlar değilse neden başarıları ile din adına övünüyoruz? Bu halde bu şahısları isimlerini İslam ve Bilim konulu kitaplardan çıkarmak gerekmez mi?
Bu bir ikiyüzlülük değil mi?
Eğer övünmeye devam edeceksek bu insanlarla teolojik ve fıkhî zeminde de barışmak gerekmez mi?
Eğer İslam tarihi içinde diğer medeniyet havzaları ile karşılaşma ve etkileşim bu gün dahi övündüğümüz sonuçlar üretmişse o halde din yorumlarımız da insanları sınır boylarında öteki dünyalarla karşılaşmaya teşvik edecek ve sonuçlarını tolere edebilecek şekilde genişlemek zorunda değil mi?
Bu büyük ve evcilleştirilmez beyinler buldukları her kaynaktan faydalanmışlar ve bilim ya da felsefe yaparken kendilerinden önceki medeniyetlerin birikimlerinden istifade etmişlerdir. Aristo ve Eflatun başta olmak özere Yunan felsefesi ile içli dışlı olmuşlar, Pers ve Babil astronomisinden istifade etmişler, Hind matematiğini kullanmışlar, Pyhtagor gibi Yunan matematikçilerinin yalnızca matematik sistemlerinin değil aynı zamanda matematik felsefelerini de benimsemişler, müzikten mantığa çok geniş bir sahada insanlığın birikiminden faydalanmışlardır.
Bu insanlar İslamın orijinal kaynakları ile diğer medeniyetlerden devşirdikleri arasında yeni ve orijinal sentezler üretmeye çalışmışlar. Zaten bilimsel ve felsefi başarıları böyle bir etkileşim olmadan mümkün olmazdı.
Bugün de Müslümanlar orijinal düşünürler, sanatçılar, ilim adamları çıkaracaksa bu “öteki” ile irtibat kurmadan, onu sevmeden ve ondan öğrenmeden olmayacak.
Her türlü yenilikçi ilmî başarı sınır bölgelerinde ortaya çıkıyor. Farklı dünyaların birleştiği yerlerde. Endülüs gibi, Bağdat gibi, Amerika gibi farklılıkların birbirlerine kavga etmeden değebildiği yerlerde.
Yani kendi dünyasını iyi tanıyan ve başka dünyalara da açılma arzusu duyan insanın cesaretle farklı bir düşünce ve kültür yapısı ile etkileşimi sonucu ortaya daha önce bilinmeyen orijinal fikirler çıkıyor. Eğer bu etkileşimden korkuyorsanız içe kapanıyor ve yeni bir söz söyleyemez hale geliyorsunuz.
Hakim dini kültür ise abartılı bir korumacı tavırla böyle bir etkileşimi engellemeye çalışıyor. Modern selefiliğin dar yorumları ile bu daha da problemli bir hal alıyor. “Kafalar karışmasın” diye Türkiye’deki ilahiyatlardan yavaş yavaş felsefe derslerinin kaldırılması bunun bir tezahürüdür mesela. Bu problemi aşmadan İslam dünyasındaki bu geniş çaplı çürüme devam edeceğe benziyor.
Özgür Koca
Zaman Amerika, 20 Nisan 2016
Tuesday, April 19, 2016
Nonverbal Communication
Scientists attach
great importance to the human capacity for spoken language. But we also have a
parallel track of nonverbal communication, and those messages may reveal more
than our carefully chosen words and sometimes be at odds with them. Since much,
if not most, of the nonverbal signaling and reading of signals is automatic and
performed outside our conscious awareness and control, through our nonverbal
cues we unwittingly communicate a great deal of information about ourselves and
our state of mind. The gestures we make, the position in which we hold our
bodies, the expressions we wear on our faces, and the nonverbal qualities of
our speech—all contribute to how others view us.
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