The environment molded the history of the Middle East as well—by shaping not just the mindsets of individuals and the cultures of societies but also the political structures of states. One definitive outcome of the aridity of Middle Eastern land was infertility, and hence “the lack of surplus.” This made it impossible for local (i.e., feudal) rulers to gain power. Instead, power was concentrated in central governments that could organize forced labor to build irrigation systems.In addition, much of the Middle East has a “flat” topography on which “armies could march unhindered”—as the Mongol armies tragically did. As a result, even before Islam, this part of the world was ruled for millennia by powerful centralized states.
Now, compare this geopolitical structure with that of Europe, which, unlike the Middle East, was a rainy and fertile continent with plenty of regions that are “hard to conquer, easy to cultivate, and their rivers and seas provide ready trade routes.” This topography, explains Fareed Zakaria,
That’s how feudalism ultimately worked in favor of freedom in Europe. The fertile land produced enough revenue to allow the rise of powerful lords, who would compete with kings for power and force them to sign liberal texts such as the Magna Carta. And when Martin Luther was excommunicated by the pope, he found support from the powerful princes of Germany who could afford to disobey Rome.
But the arid and flat Middle East only produced the “semifeudalism” of the iqta system. Here the land continued to belong to the central power and was granted only temporarily to the landlord, leading the latter to “mere pillage rather than to private development of the lands granted.” The ultimate result was the hindrance of an “independent, responsible, and non-alienated feudal class”—and the hindrance of political pluralism.
In short, while the fortunate environment of Europe helped the advance of liberty, the unfortunate environment of the Middle East established what Karl Marx called “oriental despotism” and Max Weber redefined as “patrimonialism”—a system of governance in which all power flows directly from the leader.
There was nothing inherently Islamic about this authoritarian system—no wonder it also has dominated non-Islamic countries of the East, such as Russia and China. But, alas, the connection between Oriental patrimony and Islam worked in the former’s favor as it left its mark on the latter. According to Bryan S. Turner, a leading scholar on the sociology of Islam, here was the main reason why the religion took a less rationalist and creative form after its initial centuries:
The problem was not, Turner adds, that Islam lacked something similar to the “Protestant ethic” that fostered capitalism in Europe. The urban merchants of medieval Islam, after all, “adhered to a distinctively Muslim form of rationality.” The Mutazilites (or the Murjiites), as we have seen, even extracted liberal principles from that rationalism. They just could not overcome the constraints of the Middle East.
Islam, one could say, had produced the seeds of freedom; regrettably, they just were not rooted in fertile soil.
Now, compare this geopolitical structure with that of Europe, which, unlike the Middle East, was a rainy and fertile continent with plenty of regions that are “hard to conquer, easy to cultivate, and their rivers and seas provide ready trade routes.” This topography, explains Fareed Zakaria,
made possible the rise of communities of varying sizes—city-states, duchies, republics, nations, and empires. In 1500 Europe had within it more than 500 states, many no larger than a city. This variety had two wondrous effects. First, it allowed for diversity. People, ideas, art, and even technologies that were unwelcome or unnoticed in one area would often thrive in another. Second, diversity fueled constant competition between states, producing innovation and efficiency in political organization, military technology, and economic policy.
That’s how feudalism ultimately worked in favor of freedom in Europe. The fertile land produced enough revenue to allow the rise of powerful lords, who would compete with kings for power and force them to sign liberal texts such as the Magna Carta. And when Martin Luther was excommunicated by the pope, he found support from the powerful princes of Germany who could afford to disobey Rome.
But the arid and flat Middle East only produced the “semifeudalism” of the iqta system. Here the land continued to belong to the central power and was granted only temporarily to the landlord, leading the latter to “mere pillage rather than to private development of the lands granted.” The ultimate result was the hindrance of an “independent, responsible, and non-alienated feudal class”—and the hindrance of political pluralism.
In short, while the fortunate environment of Europe helped the advance of liberty, the unfortunate environment of the Middle East established what Karl Marx called “oriental despotism” and Max Weber redefined as “patrimonialism”—a system of governance in which all power flows directly from the leader.
There was nothing inherently Islamic about this authoritarian system—no wonder it also has dominated non-Islamic countries of the East, such as Russia and China. But, alas, the connection between Oriental patrimony and Islam worked in the former’s favor as it left its mark on the latter. According to Bryan S. Turner, a leading scholar on the sociology of Islam, here was the main reason why the religion took a less rationalist and creative form after its initial centuries:
It was under the patrimonial dynasties of mediaeval Islam, starting with the Abbasids, that a different culture with its attendant view of appropriate motivation which stressed discipline, obedience and imitation came to dominate Islam. With the formation of an alliance of necessity between the military and the ulama [scholars], the shari‘a as a formalized and unchanging code of life came to embody the only legitimate language of conduct. . . . It was under these conditions that Islam was to be characterized as a slavish, fatalistic religion, a religion of accommodation to patrimonial rule.
The problem was not, Turner adds, that Islam lacked something similar to the “Protestant ethic” that fostered capitalism in Europe. The urban merchants of medieval Islam, after all, “adhered to a distinctively Muslim form of rationality.” The Mutazilites (or the Murjiites), as we have seen, even extracted liberal principles from that rationalism. They just could not overcome the constraints of the Middle East.
Islam, one could say, had produced the seeds of freedom; regrettably, they just were not rooted in fertile soil.
